Tag: Stranger Danger

  • Chapter 3. Byker: An Oral History of Outdoor Play Amongst Modernist Dreams and De-Industrial Ruination

    <- Chapter 2 – Chapter 4 ->

    1. 3.1 Introduction: A Neighbourhood Re-Placed
      1. 3.1.1 Children in the Planning and Building of Byker
      2. 3.1.2 The Participants
      3. 3.1.3 Old Byker
    2. 3.2 Destruction: Attractions and Fears of Dangerous Environments
      1. 3.2.1 De-Industrialising Places as Play Environments: Trash and Treasure
      2. 3.2.2 Cars: Unplayable Streets?
      3. 3.2.3 Drink and Drugs: Environments of Familiarity and Fear
      4. 3.2.4 Pranks, Fights, and Crime: Children as Victims and Perpetrators of Destruction
    3. 3.3 Construction: Finding Space for Play on the Fringes
      1. 3.3.1 Climbing: Play That Requires Attentiveness to Environment
      2. 3.3.2 Dens and Weather
    4. 3.4 Conclusion: Children as Sociological Explorers
    5. References

    3.1 Introduction: A Neighbourhood Re-Placed

    During the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, Byker provided a specific and formative environment for the children who called it home. In contrast to Chopwell – and indeed most North East communities – Byker’s physical landscape saw rapid change in this period. The beginning of the 1980s saw the completion of the project to knock down the ‘old Byker’ of Victorian terraces and back lanes (see Fig. 1) and construct a ‘new Byker’, with its circuitous network of roads, paths, and greens (see Fig. 3). The scale of this project was notable nt only for the sheer size of the 200 acres that was redeveloped, but also for its modernist ambition.1 The new estate’s most iconic feature was the ‘Byker wall’, a winding contiguous low-rise block of flats that enclosed the inner dwellings to shield them from a planned motorway. This not only differed from the red-brick terraces of old Byker, but the romantic styling and use of varied colour and texture also stood in stark contrast to the brutalist architectural conventions of the period.2

    The scheme was the brainchild of British architect Ralph Erskine, who had a particular interest in the relationship between architecture and the natural environment, and based his Byker design on an earlier idea of his for an ‘ecological arctic town’.3 Erskine’s inward-facing design followed the advice of contemporaneous architects and planners such as Nicolas Taylor, author of The Village in the City (1973), who advocated for neighbourhoods to act like self-contained ‘villages’ within an urban environment. A fellow architect on the project stated that the purpose of ‘vehicular separation’ in the design was to ‘allow for a dense and village-like character’, with a clear intention to blend ‘private gardens, via semi-private courtyards, to the public realm’.4

    The buildings and streets were not all that changed with the advent of New Byker. The people changed too, with only 20% of the original population ultimately moving back into the new development, despite plans to retain 50%.5 A report written for the Department of the Environment critiqued this low-retention and concluded that ‘One is only left to speculate what would have happened had the policy not been to retain the community’.6 It is difficult therefore to understate the change that Byker underwent during this period, as it lost not only its buildings, but the people within them, on top of the existing loss of traditional places of work at the shipyards and the economic and social structures intertwined with them. That the transformation of the area was so total is evidenced in the use of the still-popular framing device of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Byker, connoting a rift in the continuity of the community. The area hadn’t simply changed, it had been ‘re-placed’; its identity as an environment and community had been overwritten.

    Figure I. Old Byker, Carville Road, looking toward city centre, 1969.7

    Figure II. Map of Byker in 1970.8 Note the already bulldozed streets (dot-outlined) to the north, making way for the new development.

    Figure III. New Byker, looking toward city centre, 2016.9

    Figure IV. Map of Byker in 1980.10

    Academic work on Byker has tended to focus on the architectural merit of new Byker rather than the experience of Byker’s population. Much of this literature, particularly that written between the 1970s and 1990s, considered the estate as a ‘good example’ of modern urban design, not least because the estate was developed in close consultation with its future residents. For example, in 1976 architect Alison Ravetz observed that the integration of features from the old Byker ‘gave the feeling of Portmeirion without Portmeirion’s hollow disappointment and sham, because this is for ordinary people to live in’.11 In 1987, architect Mary Comerio argued that Erskine’s ‘concern for public participation’ was the key to the scheme’s success and would allow them to ‘rehouse [residents] without breaking family ties, patterns of life and neighbourhood traditions’.12 As already noted, however, this optimistic assessment did not reflect the reality of the low retention rate of original residents. Architectural historian Elain Harwood also praised Erskine’s achievement, in 2000 noting that the establishment of a ‘tree bank’ which ‘ensured a continuity and that the landscape element was not cut from budgets in subsequent phases’.13 However, notwithstanding the valuable academic work on Byker, children were never the focus – or even a sub-category – of analysis.14 This is surprising given the apparent child-friendliness of new Byker’s pedestrianised spaces, colourful balconies, and varied green spaces. But this absence of children in the literature also reflects Erskine’s own tendency to frame his work as ‘people friendly’, without specific reference to children. You may take any work from Erskine, his team, or those writing about them and will find many references to designing for ‘people’, but scant or more likely no reference to children. His interest in Nordic-style social-democratic principles inculcated a design philosophy wherein every person was considered an equal user of a space, but this approach failed to consider how different categories of people use a space differently.

    3.1.1 Children in the Planning and Building of Byker

    An example of how children were conceived of by the architects can be read in Michael Dradge’s 2008 reflections on the project. Dradge, one of Erskine’s original architectural team, talked up the successes of Byker with particular reference to community engagement. Dradge says that at its peak in the mid-1970s the architects had an on-site office of ‘fifteen staff, plus four clerks of works’, which allowed them to keep residents informed about the ongoing works and solicit feedback.15 Dradge recounts how the architects hand-built a ‘prototype children’s play area’ outside their office and ran a children’s drawing club to help ‘break down barriers and get parents talking to the architectural team’.16 It is clear here that the architects recognised how children can act as key facilitators of community involvement, as indeed they would go on to do when New Byker was complete. It is also revealing of the way children would be expected to behave in the New Byker; as users of prescribed play equipment and activities by adults. That New Byker’s plan included playgrounds and a school was implicitly understood as ‘planning for children’, yet the myriad of resident complaints that soon arose around noise, climbing, landscaping and more, in relation to children shows how the plan did not account for what young people would actually value in the environment and how that may come into conflict with the values of adult residents.

    It is also noteworthy that Dradge speculated that it wouldn’t be possible to do make the prototype playground and drawing club ‘today’ (in 2008) because they were living in ‘more litigious times’ and a ‘less innocent age [where] all kinds of formalities and checks would, no doubt, apply’, referencing new developments such as the establishment in 2002 of the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB, precursor to the DBS) which required background checks for those working with children.17 Aside from neatly demonstrating the change in parenting culture between the 1980s and 2000s, Dradge’s speculation highlights how the sorts of handmade informal play structures they erected would come to be considered a problem by residents when children later built them on their own terms.

    Despite the emphasis these writers placed on consultation, Byker’s design was similar to Erskine’s ecological arctic town concepts of the 1950s, and also to the millennium village project he later worked on in London. This suggests his ideas about what constituted good urban design were quite decided, bringing into question the extent to which Byker residents had the power to influence the designs. Dradge makes it clear that when it came to community involvement ‘the aim was always to demystify the process’; the key purpose, therefore, being to explain and convince residents of the architects’ plans rather than devise these plans in equal collaboration with the Byker populace, which is the impression sometimes given by both the contemporary and academic literature.

    Figure V. Erskine’s Millenium village built in the 2000s.18

    Figure VI. Inside The Wall, built in the 1980s.19

    Figure VII. Plan for ‘An Ecological Arctic Town’, 1958.20

    Figure VIII. Aerial view of the western section of New Byker, 2016.21

    Indeed, despite his overall positive evaluation, issues on the estate were evident to Dradge by 2008. He noted five problems: ‘the assimilation of new residents’, ‘people wanting to park right next to their houses’, ‘need for the restoration of hard and soft landscaping’, and ‘a greater demand for privacy’.22 As Dradge conceded, Byker had not fulfilled the promises promoted by its architect-planners and fallen into disrepair. His concerns were emblematic of a new wave of academic research that began to re-evaluate Byker, challenging the optimistic accounts of the architect-planners.

    Most thorough was architect Robin Abrams’ Byker Revisited (2003) which followed up on his first visit in 1983. In the 1980s Abrams had already begun to spot problems arising on the estate, noting ‘more incidents of vandalism’ in the less desirable area of south Byker.23 Due to the landscaping being too expensive to maintain it ‘quickly became overgrown’ and, Abrams says, elderly residents feared the children and teenagers who hid in, or set fire to, the shrubbery. Furthermore, tree sap dripped onto parked cars, and people were cutting down trees and shrubs in their gardens that blocked the light. Others complained that the sound of birds kept them awake at night.24 For the residents of old Byker (and those older residents who had moved in from other areas) who were used to a far more orderly terraced environment, the natural elements of new Byker could often be an annoyance rather than a joy. The beauty of the communal network of natural landscaping, conceived of for ornament rather than function, rubbed up against the realities of working life. This was not the same as a leafy, wealthy suburb where greenery is largely kept and maintained in private gardens. Instead, some residents felt like their house was an island within a landscape of unkempt wilderness very different from the romanticised understanding of ‘the wild’ that Erskine’s design evoked.25

    With Byker Revisited in 2003 Abrams described a community in a far greater state of distress than 20 years earlier, and outlined more clearly the failures of design that had contributed to the area’s challenges. As first observed in the 1980s, one factor was that residents had ‘an inherent understanding of where the preferred housing clusters are’. The northern section or top of the hill was better, as had been the case in Old Byker. This meant the old residents chose to live at the top, near the wall, relegating newcomers to the lower areas. They also chose to shop on Shields Road rather than the new shopping area in south Byker, as this was also what had been done in old Byker. This expedited the decline of south Byker in favour of the north, and represented a rejection of new Byker’s self-contained design philosophy from its residents. Even though the environment encouraged people to stay within the ‘village’ to go shopping, many chose to cross the wall due to social and economic factors, and thus demonstrated a desire for urban connectivity that their children would have witnessed and – due to their limited independence – often been denied.

    The dilapidation of Byker’s public spaces during the 1990s and early 2000s was a manifestation of the failure of Erskine’s socialised concepts of space to match the prevailing inward turn of the neoliberal era, leaving communal areas abandoned to those who had nowhere else to go. For many children, of course, this was often a different story. With little attachment to the old landscape or the ways of living that came with it, young people instead were presented with an environment that many described to me as a place great for exploration, play, and hiding from the adult world. It was a place to build dens, hide scrap, start fires, or try other things their parents wouldn’t want them to. As adopters of Byker’s public space, many of its children were kept away from it simultaneously because adults worried it could pose them a danger and that they could pose a danger within it.

    In 1993, a field study by a team of American architecture students found that most parents expected that their children would leave Byker for ‘better areas’.26 They compared the relatively stable community of north Byker to a housing cluster in south Byker called Bolam Coyne that, they concluded, was under ‘serious social stress’.27 Bolam Coyne was in certain respects a microcosm of the new Byker development. It was an inward-facing courtyard structure troubled with vandalism, anti-social behaviour, drug-use, and crime and became somewhat infamous locally for it. In the early 2000s, the Byker housing office polled residents and found that they wanted it pulled down and replaced with a car park.28 The insularity of Bolam Coyne locked residents into a social contract with troublesome neighbours, and necessarily restricted opportunities for roaming, discovery, and connection with residents outside their complex. Seeing Bolam Coyne’s demise, Abrams called it ‘a canary in a coal mine’ for the whole project, and identified the root of ‘the problem’ to be that all the housing was ‘designed for a single economic class, and a single ethnic group, and then a surrounding wall was built’.29 Thus the very poor wanted to get in to the area, and those that achieved greater prosperity considered it a mark of success to leave.

    Twenty years on, a different perspective can be offered that challenges the gloomy prognoses of the early 21st century: Byker is neither utopian dream nor dystopic failure. Bolam Coyne was not demolished for a car park but was listed and eventually given an award-winning redevelopment.30 In 2008 the council began estate-wide refurbishment works, which later continued after 2012 when Byker at large was taken into a community trust and saw the restoration of its exteriors, interiors, and landscaping with financing available to the trust as a charitable enterprise. Byker today still has many problems. By the standards of the North East, it has comparatively high unemployment, a high crime rate, and low levels of education, but it is arguably in a more settled state and no longer attracts the same levels of regional or national attention it once did.31 To borrow a biological term, this loss of status as a ‘charismatic’ (or flagship, emblematic) estate is likely why there is far less recent academic literature on the area. As a local historian born in 1998 who was not aware of any academic ‘Byker debate’ growing up, this makes it easier to assess both the successes and failures of the estate in the round without being required to either defend the place, or to reproach it. For the participants too, it was a simpler exercise to be reflective on the area’s past without needing to first address any larger discourse that surrounded Byker in previous decades.

    The interviews I have conducted with Byker residents show that those Byker residents who grew up during the 1980s recollected much excitement and joy in the process of redevelopment. Both the condemned old buildings and construction sites of the new were excellent places for exploration and play, and when complete the new homes had more facilities and were in better condition than the old terraces, which had been condemned as early as 1953.32 The new Byker also featured more pedestrian-only and green spaces, which provided opportunities for different types of play. The disruption to daily life and the displacement of the old community that many parents mourned had little impact on the children who were at the vanguard of forming what would become a new Byker community.

    As my discussion of the secondary literature implies, there appears to have been a decline in optimism among Byker’s youth during the 1990s and 2000s, as the community continued to change environmentally, socially, and economically. The interviews herein reveal how the national trend of decreasing child mobility manifested itself in Byker, which despite featuring car-lite design also saw a fall in free outdoor childhood play. This tells us that we cannot only look at environmental factors when assessing children’s relationship with the environment; they must be placed in social and cultural context. The national concerns established earlier in this thesis, such as ‘stranger danger’, new technologies, and the threat from cars combined with and catalysed area-specific factors surrounding poverty, drugs, environmental management policies, and local features of Byker’s urban fabric. Child mobility is known to be linked to community cohesion, and the fall in child mobility during this period reduced social connectivity in a vicious cycle of restriction and isolation.33

    While Byker’s physical form was fully reimagined for a post-industrial era, its economic, social, and cultural structures were not, and they carried the vestiges of the North East’s de-industrial half-life into a new era. There was thus a significant mismatch between the broader rapidly changing economy and society of the 1980s and 1990s that could be described as ‘post-industrial’, and that of Byker and the North East at large, that could be described as ‘de-industrial’, resulting in rising unemployment, poverty, crime, and parental fear.

    In this chapter I explore the different needs and values Byker’s young people sought in their environment during a 30-year period of upheaval in the shape of North East childhoods. At times, these needs and values resulted in unforeseen and unintended environmental uses and consequences, as well as undesirable conflicts of desires between generations. Part 3.1.2 of this chapter will explain the interview process and the participants I spoke with. Part 3.1.3 will then contextualise the research undertaken by exploring the ‘Old Byker’ against which ‘New Byker’ was popularly framed. Parts 3.2 and 3.3 comprise the majority of the work, using 20 oral testimonies to explore and engage the stories of Byker’s children as they grew up amidst a rapidly changing world of new technological, economic, social, and environmental realities. Part 3.2 will focus on the theme of ‘destruction’, and 3.3 on the theme of ‘construction’ to draw out narratives of how change was negotiated – physically and intellectually – during the period. Within this bisected structure, parts 3.2 and 3.3 will divide their analysis by topics that illustrate key forms of interaction between environment and child. Under the theme of destruction, I consider de-industrialisation, cars, drink and drugs, and pranks, fights, and crime. Under the theme of construction I address climbing, dens, and weather. Through talking to ex-child residents I seek to draw a close, intimate, and complex picture of how children negotiated destruction and construction: attempting – and sometimes failing – to make the landscape their own; often against the odds. Hence, I will be reevaluating Byker’s iconic streetscape from a new angle, one long disregarded in the planning literature.

    3.1.2 The Participants

    I asked for volunteers who had grown up in Byker between 1980-2010 and conducted interviews with 20 Byker residents between 10 May 2022 and 19 December 2022. Participants were gathered through a variety of methods. First, I postered noticeboards at the community centre and in the windows of local shops as well as soliciting volunteers in various businesses and shops. These approaches proved to be ineffective however, and I only recruited one person by them. More effective (and less physically tiring) was recruiting through local Facebook groups – mostly the ‘Bygone Byker’ group, which is used as a hub for communal remembrance, commemoration, and investigation of Byker’s past. I recruited half a dozen participants this way and from this starting point recruited the rest by snowballing. The interviews were arranged according to the needs of each participant, with five being conducted online, and the rest conducted in-person at people’s homes, cars, in local cafes, and around the neighbourhood in walking interviews.

    The final participant in this process was me. I was born in North-East England in 1998 and grew up a 10-minute walk from Byker in adjacent Heaton. I have been and still am in the neighbourhood often, usually to go shopping on Shields Road, and I have friends who live in the area. However, I was not well known in Byker at the time of this research and none of the participants knew me personally before the interviews. Therefore, although I knew the estate well from both personal and research experience going into the interviews, I was rightly considered an outsider by the interviewees. In my position as ‘somewhat local’, I agree with Moser’s argument that personality traits generally superseded positionality when it came to the interviews. Whether I was considered local or not by the participants was less important than the strength of the interpersonal connection between us, the tricky interplay of civility, humility, curiosity, and humour.34 As Hammersley and Atkinson suggest, effectively handling ‘field relations’ requires a mix of ‘patience, diplomacy…and occasionally boldness’.35

    Although there were many things I knew of Byker’s past academically, participants often still had to explain to me various aspects of the estate’s geography, history, and terminology. For example, where a certain street was or what the name of a childhood game meant. I would argue that my unfamiliarity with the estate can partly be explained by the insular characteristics of the Byker wall, which Erskine deliberately designed to disincentivise non-residents from entering. With no convenient crossing points, many times I entered the area by crossing Byker bridge at a well-used gap in roadside fencing. It is also true that Heaton and Byker have two different school catchment areas (a primary school opened at the centre of the new Byker estate in 1982) and that Heaton is a richer neighbourhood, being quite literally ‘on the other side of the tracks’.

    The interviews were semi-structured, and I asked each participant a range of questions on themes of play, safety, community, and technology. Within these themes I asked participants about de-industrialising playscapes, games and pranks linked to particular environmental features or events, perceptions of safety and negotiation of restrictions, communal child-minding, the social role of shops, animals, nature, and weather, differences in gender activities and parenting; den making; vandalism; drugs; and technology. Interviewees were also asked to consider how growing up in Byker has changed since they were young and – for those participants that were parents – how they raised their children in comparison to how they were raised. Conversation often progressed onto topics outside of my pre-set list of questions, and I was happy to allow participants to talk about what seemed important to them about growing up in Byker, making space for ideas I had not yet considered. The main objective of this focused, local case study was to deepen understanding of how the children of Byker perceived, experienced, shaped and were shaped by their environment over the three decades of study.

    The twenty individuals interviewed represent men and women who were children in Byker across the period of study, though with a skew towards women and the 1980s. This self-selecting sample also represents long-term residents who identify strongly with Byker, and therefore does not represent those who feel unincorporated into the area’s social fabric. All the participants gave permission for their testimony to be used for research purposes, though three did so under condition of anonymity and five under use of their first name only. In total, fourteen women and six men were interviewed. The greater willingness of women in Byker to be interviewed is interesting because this was not the case in Chopwell, where an almost equal split was achieved. The character and self-selecting nature of the testimonies gathered suggests that this was due to a difference in feeling of connection to, and ownership of, place. Because those that came forward to speak with me were those with the most interest and investment in talking about Byker’s history, this suggests that in the round Byker’s women felt a greater sense of connection to their environment than men. The estate’s troubled history throughout the period of study was brought up by all participants, in which unemployment and disillusionment among men in particular grew with the loss of traditional industry. In contrast, whilst enduring the same hardships as the menfolk, many of the women I interviewed grew up in a period in which it was felt that their economic and social horizons were broadening. Even though girls throughout the period of study were given less opportunity to play out and engage with their local environment than boys, they still did so, and built a lasting sense of belonging that decades later would influence their decision to respond to my call for an interview.

    This chapter will compare the decades these people grew up in whilst acknowledging that neither their childhoods nor the studied environments were constrained by arbitrary annual boundaries. Nevertheless, participants tended to identify themselves as being ‘a child of’ a particular decade, by which they referred to the decade in which they began to find independence and discover tastes and hobbies outside of their parent’s sphere of influence (around age 8). Those interviewed also fell into the broader categories of ‘generation x’ and ‘millennial’, but when talking about childhood specifically a decade-bound framing is more common in the British popular imagination and was naturally used by the participants. This proved to be a deeply practical way of organising the gathered material. In the table below, therefore, is listed the participants’ ‘Child of’ decade. Of those interviewed, one was a child of the 1970s, eight of the 1980s, six of the 1990s, and five of the 2000s. Also listed is the format of each interview.

    PARTICIPANTS, BYKER
    NameGenderChild of’ DecadeInterview Format
    Pauline AlnwickF1970sOnline
    Alan RobsonM1980sWalking
    Anonymous Byker 1 ‘Sarah’F1980sIn-Person
    AmandaF1980sWalking
    Denise NicholsF1980sOnline
    Shelley Landale DownF1980sOnline
    Susan WhittakerF1980sWalking
    Michael ScottM1980sOnline
    ValF1980sIn-Person
    Bill RichardsonM1990sWalking
    DanM1990sOnline
    David GreenM1990sIn-Person
    Lisa RichardsonF1990sWalking
    Lynne SteeleF1990sWalking
    Yvonne LeaneyF1990sWalking
    Andy MillerM2000sWalking
    Anonymous Byker 2 ‘Jamie’F2000sIn-Person
    Anonymous Byker 3 ‘Rebecca’F2000sIn-Person
    KateF2000sWalking
    SophieF2000sIn-Person

    3.1.3 Old Byker

    ‘Old Byker’ was often invoked in my conversations with people for this research, even though most of the people I talked to have only ever known its successor. However, by fortunate mistake I ended up speaking with a child of the 1960s and 1970s, Pauline Alnwick, about what it was like to grow up in Old Byker. This proved to be very useful as it provided valuable context and a baseline by which to assess how childhoods changed in Byker in subsequent decades, and as a result I decided to conduct a similar interview in Chopwell. Before the bulldozers moved in, Byker was effectively considered a ‘slum’ by the council, with many dilapidated and abandoned buildings due to the decline of shipbuilding and other heavy industry. Pauline described the enormous communal bonfires they would have on bonfire night to get rid of all the scrap that was lying around:

    Everybody in Byker was filling the lanes and streets around this open fire. It was right next to Raby Street, just like in the back lanes of Raby Street. Oh my gosh, it was so huge that windows were smashing, you know, the light, the streetlights as well… The kids were mostly like, you know, excited and just kind of you know, getting involved in this sort of, I don’t know, the mania of it. (Pauline, F, 1970s)

    This is an example of the many dangers of old Byker for its young residents, who would play in and on the condemned terraces, and were drawn from across the estate to the Raby Street bonfire. In a game of chasey ‘there was no barrier to where you went, so if somebody went on top of a roof or a wall, you had to get up there too’. Notably across the decades the games of ‘chasey’ described to me (otherwise known as ‘ratcatcher’ or ‘ratty’) had increasingly small bounds. Whereas Pauline says ‘there was no barrier’ to the game in the 1970s, Lynn told me that it was ‘confined to kind of short areas’ in the 1990s.

    One thing Pauline loved as a 1970s child was the TV, telling me she was ‘a complete television fan… I didn’t really have books when I was little. The TV was it. TV and music.’ This demonstrates that the story of the decline in outdoor childhood play is not a simple one, so often blamed today on screens and new technologies. Technologies such as the TV were a huge presence in Pauline’s 1970s childhood, as computers and video games came to be for those I interviewed during the 1980s and mobile phones during the 2000s. New technologies cannot simply be cited as the cause of the decline in children’s free play when the halcyon days many recall were saturated with screens.

    The economic and commercial landscape of Byker massively changed between Old and New. In Pauline’s youth most mams worked part or full-time in the home, meaning there were many adults around to keep a passive eye on the children. Pauline remembered that ‘you always had grannies and mams looking out for the kids, no matter where you were’. As Wajcman observes, this casual network of mothers able to watch, and even discipline, each other’s children was a long-established way of life for working-class people in Britain and was facilitated by an economic model that forced women to stay at home.36 The density of the housing and the economic ability of the community to support a network of walkable local shops was also key to this, as this facilitated the necessary network of ‘eyes on the street’ to safeguard Byker’s children.37

    Because everything was in walking distance and most people did not have the means to travel much outside the area, growing up in Old Byker was an all-encompassing experience. As Pauline described it: ‘I had a very sheltered existence, really. My whole world was there’. This meant trips outside the area were rare to non-existent. Pauline didn’t ever remember being taken out on a trip somewhere apart from ‘being took to Whitley Bay once and my oldest sister would take us to Heaton Park if she was in a good mood’. The collapse of this world then, broke down barriers for Byker’s young people. At the same time, Pauline recalled how young people mourned the loss of their ‘safe space’.

    Even as kids we felt sad about all those places being taken out, you know, places that you would have been playing in. (Pauline, F, 1970s)

    The children’s concerns for the old streets must have been partly a reflection of the wider concern of their parents and the community, which was vocally against Erskine’s redesign. This was vocalised in The Byker Phoenix, a community newspaper that campaigned on behalf of residents and attempted to influence the shape of redevelopment in Byker.

    Figure IX. Page from Byker Phoenix, date unknown.38

    The construction of new Byker changed everything first and foremost because it meant people had to be moved out to other areas of the city while the place was demolished and rebuilt. Pauline recalled how this fragmented the old community:

    Once Byker was done, we were all expected to go back… but people were like so unhappy they didn’t want to go back because it wasn’t Byker anymore. (Pauline, F, 1970s)

    This context is useful to understand when considering childhoods of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, because the legacy of Old Byker lingered on. For example, a 2008 report found the North East to be one of the most sociable regions of Britain.39 Pattison argues this was due to the ‘half-life of de-industrialisation’ in the region, whereby lingering environmental and social structures of the industrial era created ‘a strong and federated sense of mutuality’ that persisted.40 Nostalgic narratives across de-industrial communities in Britain today paint many aspects of post-war working-class life as superior to the modern day whilst underplaying the associated hardships and inequalities, but the fragmentation of community and sociability is one narrative that this thesis supports. Indeed, the decline of ‘community’ in Byker from a time in the 1980s when ‘everyone knew everyone’ (that so many participants in this project noted) is a clear trend that tracks alongside the national ‘loss of childhood’ that this thesis seeks to explain in the North East context.

    Pauline mourned a perceived loss of sociability in Byker, and so too did every other participant I interviewed. Desire for a return to a more communal environment can be seen to be part of the process of the half-life of de-industrialisation: a mourning for the social structures that were lost with the end of traditional industrial employment on Tyneside.41 Whilst the redeveloped Byker brought positive change in terms of improved living and working conditions for many, it did not replace many of the non-physical factors that were lost with the end of shipbuilding and manufacturing, such as jobs moving out of the area, or the increasing need for two adult incomes to support a family.

    3.2 Destruction: Attractions and Fears of Dangerous Environments

    Walking around, walking around this town…

    What’ll be left, when the old streets come down?

    Byker, you’ve born and bred some men…

    If they tear you down your time won’t come again.

    ‘Byker Song’.42

    3.2.1 De-Industrialising Places as Play Environments: Trash and Treasure

    Broadcast on Tyne Tees Television in 1974, the lamentation of two unnamed musicians in Byker Song that ‘if they tear you down your time won’t come again’ proved to be true for most residents of Old Byker that were moved away during the redevelopment and never returned. Many children, however, found much to be excited about amidst the ever-changing environment of destruction and construction during the 1980s. Indeed, the more settled and orderly Byker of the 1990s and 2000s provided fewer opportunities for outdoor play, exploration, and transgression.

    The newly built Byker of the 1980s possessed a liminal quality. New people moving into the estate had not yet formed an established community and the de-industrial process meant it was difficult to categorise as either ‘industrial’ or ‘post-industrial’.43 The concept of the ‘half-life’ acknowledges that industrial ruination is a lived process, enduring and complex, for people occupying the in-between spaces of post-industrial change. In this, Linkon’s concept agrees with Mah who wrote about Walker – an adjacent neighbourhood to Byker with similar heritage – in recognising the de-industrialised sense of being caught between two phases, negotiating a transition that lacks a clear end point.44 Strangleman also highlighted the half-life as characterised by ‘temporal open-endedness’.45 Because of the scale of its environmental change, I argue that Byker moved faster through the half-life process than other communities, but the evidence of my interviews also suggests that some structures of feeling remain today – decades after the loss of industry. This new liminal neighbourhood was not yet settled by any adult community. This provided an opening for children to move in and claim dominion. In remembering the redevelopment works, Susan described playing on the big rubble heaps that would pile up:

    [The rubble heaps] were death traps really. But as a kid, they were just brilliant, they were just like disneyland you know?… We used to slide down them, winter when they were snowy and it was icy. Brilliant. (Susan, F, 1980s)

    By acts of play such as this, Susan and her friends found value in environments that the adult world had deemed valueless, and her retrospective assessment of the rubble heaps as ‘death traps’ demonstrates the change in her value system since youth. This dissonance in values between children and adults – even between an individual’s younger and older self – refutes a simplistic narrative of destruction, turning these processes into matters of perspective. Where an adult sees wasteland, a child can see ‘disneyland’. Trash and treasure.

    Demolition sites were not the only environmental reminders/remainders of Old Byker during the 1980s; the site’s steep geography also carried through. The top end of Byker is one of the highest points in Newcastle, from which you can get magnificent views over the city. In Old Byker Victorian gridded streets led directly downhill to the shipyards and although the redesign had replaced these with a more circuitous network, they did not eliminate all steep streets such as St Peter’s Road completely. This geography facilitated forms of play – namely any form of sliding or wheeling – that would be less interesting and less dangerous in flatter neighbourhoods.

    I thought of how great it would be to skate down the bank… not knowing that I would pick up speed. And this is the first time I’d ever done it… Well, all lumps and bumps are literally flying all over and I realised, you know, straight away, I was in trouble… (Shelley, F, 1980s)

    Equipped with a new pair of roller blades (a 1980s trend in Byker as elsewhere), Shelley’s curiosity got the better of her and only by grabbing onto a lamppost and crashing to the floor did she save herself from speeding further downhill to a potentially ruinous fate. This topography is another example of play at the ‘rough edges’ of a place. Rough edges that would be sanded back with time – as rubble was cleared and barriers erected – precisely to discourage (self)destructive behaviours like those recollected by Susan and Shelley.

    It is important however in the context of de-industrialisation that environmental factors are not considered without also factoring in the estate’s economic and social strife during this period. De-industrialisation and ruination are processes and understanding the Byker landscape as a site that contained, reflected, and drove change is key to understanding how and why the nature of childhood evolved during this period too. In contrast to, for example, nearby ruins of Hadrian’s Wall preserved and maintained by heritage organisations, de-industrialising communities are not ruins; they are involved with processes of ruination that encompass much more than only environmental factors. For example, in the 1990s Byker experienced unemployment rates of 27% and was the third most deprived ward in Newcastle.46 The estate, typical of many social housing developments during that time, faced issues of anti-social behaviour and crime, resulting in a high number of empty tenancies. A Community Appraisal of Byker in 2001 highlighted it as having the highest and fastest termination of tenancies in Newcastle.47 These economic and social problems led to abandoned and derelict streetscapes which came with associated stigma and the area earning a reputation as ‘sink estate’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The story of the ‘Byker Rat-Boy’ – who escaped police by hiding in The Wall’s ventilation – became notorious and synonymous with the area.48 Overall, fear both for and of children drove parents’ reluctance to encourage unsupervised play in such an environment, compared to when ‘New Byker’ was genuinely new, clean, and full of modernist promise. Robin Abrams, an architect who visited the estate in 2001, said this:

    Throughout the community, upper and lower, there were burned, boarded up houses. The incidence of untended gardens far outnumbered the tidy ones. All shops in the lower shopping precinct were boarded up. Portions of the Byker Wall appeared to be abandoned – previously secured entrances were open, the lobbies covered with graffiti. The landscaping was ragged or in some cases missing altogether; litter and graffiti were rampant. The entire community, not just the lower areas, projected an image of desolation and despair.49

    2001/2 CRIME RATE STATISTICS BY WARD
    WARDCRIME RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION
    Benwell141.6
    Blakelaw108.0
    Byker211.6
    Castle48.8
    Dene58.7
    Denton86.8
    Elswick211.7
    Fawdon71.5
    Tyne and Wear (Overall)106.1
    England and Wales (Overall)110.5

    Figure X. Table showing 2001/2 Newcastle crime rates for some wards. At 211, Byker’s is considerably higher than the overall Tyne and Wear and England and Wales rates.50

    By 2010 Byker was certainly in better condition than in 2001 after seeing investment and efforts to ‘tidy up’ and increase tenancy, but many pre-1990s features of the estate never returned. Indeed, some people I interviewed described contemporary Byker in Abrams-like terms such as Lisa (F, 1990s) who said ‘everything’s, like wreck and ruin now compared to when we were kids’. Note, however, that as a child of the 1990s, Lisa still remembered the Byker of that decade as better kept than that of the 2020s. Given the descriptions of ‘desolation and despair’ that Abrams described Byker being left in just after the 1990s, this must at least partly be seen as nostalgia. However, the sense of a ‘loss of place’ expressed by Lisa and other participants I talked to was not only the product of rose-tinted spectacles. Whilst Byker was ostensibly ‘tidied up’ from the mid-2000s onward, this did not reverse the steady decline in working-class culture and community. Traditions of communalism and multi-generational employment have strong roots in North East England and this ‘structure of feeling’ was part of that legacy.51 Over time however, as Lisa observed, this legacy and connection to industrial communalism weakened. Furthermore, the tidying up of New Byker in the 2000s commonly resulted in degradation of the play environment to facilitate a more orderly environment. Damaged shelters and play structures weren’t replaced, fences, spikes, and CCTV cameras were erected, and trees and shrubs were uprooted. The excitement that many children took in the demolition of Old Byker demonstrates that their relationship to its destruction held a different character to that of their parents. Thirty years later the efforts to tidy up New Byker can also be seen, from certain perspectives, to be a form of ruination.

    One key indicator of decline identified by participants was the closure of local shops over the period. New Byker was built with dedicated spaces for small shops but, as Abrams observed, by 2001 ‘all shops in the lower shopping precinct were boarded up’. Residents preferred to shop outside the estate on Shields Road because it was seen as the classier option and the opening of large supermarkets nearby continued to draw footfall away from local businesses. The economic destruction of many small shops in favour of fewer larger ones impacted Byker’s built form and the social aspect of the shop and shopping street as places of encounter. The sense of loss attached to participants’ testimonies on shops was not necessarily about economic prosperity, but rather the positive social and environmental spaces shops created, strengthening kinship ties between friends and families.

    It’s completely changed now. When I was a kid there was plenty of nice shops, there was Beavans [a local department store] there was shops… butchers, post office… y’know, you didn’t have to go far. Everything was just there. (Val, F, 1980s)

    Figure XI. Signage for Beavans, the old department store, still preserved today.52

    The type of urban fabric that disappeared during the period of study had helped to facilitate an environment of child safety by encouraging walking over driving, leading to more people and eyes on the street to keep passive watch over the kids, as well as fewer cars on the road to endanger them. Val’s memory highlights how the accessibility of these shops also gave children more independence as they could go to browse and buy things for themselves. New Byker’s reduced population density meant it could support fewer local businesses. Furthermore, whilst Erskine’s design was pedestrian friendly in one sense – if you wanted to move within its confines – it made travelling beyond a more attractive proposition by car.

    3.2.2 Cars: Unplayable Streets?

    ‘Kids would play in the road, they wouldn’t be scared of cars. You could play out and have like an hour on Allendale Road – which is kind of a main road – for an hour on an evening time and maybe not see one or two cars.’ (Yvonne, F, 1990s)

    This memory comes from a generation of Byker children who were some of the last able to play out on the street in this way without the constant fear of traffic. As my interviews show, the 1980s was the decade that marked the end of a centuries-long norm, already declining in decades prior, that the street could be used as a site of play. Yvonne’s memory of the 1990s however, demonstrates that mostly car-free outdoor play did persist in Byker into the 1990s, a working-class area in a region where rates of car ownership were slower to rise than the national average (in 2001 Newcastle had 3 cars for every 10 people, compared to British average of 5 for every 10).53 The increase in car ownership and traffic in Britain explored in Chapter One fundamentally altered the landscape of childhood play, as the added risk and reduction in quality of the outdoor environment led children to play either elsewhere, or simply less.

    Compounding this the new dangers posed by cars caused parents to increase restrictions on children’s outdoor activities. This in turn contributed to a tearing of Byker’s social fabric, as children were less likely to gather and play together in the streets. The sense of community that was fostered through these interactions began to erode, leading to a more fragmented and isolated environment for adults as well as children. Over time, this problem was entrenched as infrastructural changes were made to accommodate the growing number of vehicles, prioritising the needs of drivers over the safety of pedestrians and cohesion of communities. Unlike the destruction of de-industrialisation, cars were a form of destruction that repelled rather than attracted young people to the outside realm.

    Byker, however, was designed to be different. Erskine’s vision for Byker was of a car-lite neighbourhood, with many pedestrian-only streets and squares. Yvonne’s recollection of car-free play persisting into the 1990s is testament to a mark of success of this design philosophy. However, further evidence demonstrates that as car numbers in the North East continued to rise Byker, too, became overrun. The Wall shielded its residents only a little from the large forces at work across Britain during this period of individualisation, fear of strangers, de-industrialisation, and expansion of road infrastructure. It is also the case that Erskine’s walled design – skirted by a high-speed road – incentivised car adoption as much as the pedestrianised interior disincentivised it. Walking around Byker today there are still many areas that are inaccessible to cars, but also several small streets and squares that have come to serve primarily as car parks. In 2002 Byker residents petitioned to have the Bolam Coyne housing cluster pulled down and replaced with a car park, although unsuccessfully.54 During a walk Susan pointed out to me a car park on Brinkburn Close that had been a playground before it was removed in the early 2000s, and when I asked subsequent participants about this some of them also remembered its existence. It is telling, however, that most people had forgotten the existence of this playground, as it demonstrates the power environment exerts on memory. ‘Out of sight, out of mind’ very much applies in the context of children’s infrastructure where those who used it soon grow out of it. To emphasise this point, a playground by Laverock Court was removed which no participants mentioned to me.55

    Figure XII. Brinkburn Close car park, previously a playground.56

    When considering why children over time had come to feel less ‘at home’ in Byker’s outdoor spaces, participants of all three decades talked about how children wouldn’t be allowed or ‘wouldn’t get away’ with the sort of roaming and play activities archetypal of the earlier period. This has been a recurring narrative across generations that is reflective of three things in the context of 1980-2010. Firstly, childhood nostalgia played a role as participants tended to focus on positive experiences over negative ones. Secondly, the desire for secrecy in many children’s activities – highlighted often within the testimonies of this thesis – naturally results in adults often not being aware of the full extent of young people’s activities, especially those most transgressive. Thirdly there was a real and significant loss of freedom for children over these decades, driven significantly by an increased parental and societal focus on safety and a changing urban fabric unfriendly to the young. Cars were (and continue to be) a major contributing factor to this. Even in a neighbourhood designed to be car-lite, cars slowly pervaded the space and, unlike other factors limiting child mobility, were readily accepted as immutable facts of life. For instance, Tracey told me that despite growing up in the 1980s and feeling the urban landscape was entirely safe she still drove ‘to most places now’ and wouldn’t let her children play with as much freedom as she had. For many older participants, their understanding and appreciation of Byker’s heritage was gained through unsupervised exploration and personal experiences of the place. This opportunity was lost for younger generations amidst a vicious cycle of more cars meaning fewer people meaning more cars meaning fewer people.

    3.2.3 Drink and Drugs: Environments of Familiarity and Fear

    The problem of drugs in Byker came to the fore in the 1990s alongside rising unemployment, crime, and dilapidation. At the same time, alcoholism had always been an issue during and before the 1980s that led to violence and anti-social behaviour, making the streets less safe for children. The key difference between the impact of drugs and alcohol was that drinking was an accepted normal function of community, and even its negative externalities were somewhat overlooked. The difference in participants’ perceptions of drink and drugs was clear in our conversations. As is the common view across Britain, in all the interviews I conducted there was a sense of warmth towards drinking culture never extended to drug culture, despite drink undoubtedly being the longer standing and more pervasive aggravator of anti-social behaviour. Denise described how public drunkenness was a common sight in the 1980s:

    All the blokes drunk really regularly. Then most of the women drunk on the weekends with the blokes, so drinking and drunkenness was quite common. You would see it. You still see it now. But there was a lot more pubs then. (Denise, F, 1980s)

    Drinking and drunkenness was, and continued to be, a fact of life. Women being party to the culture was important as it meant – being held primarily responsible for children – they were less likely to see its dangers as serious. Scenes of drunken fighting, squabbling, and teasing were less threatening to parents when they knew the people involved, and with whom they may well have been drinking with themselves. The closure of local pubs also changed this dynamic, as it moved drinking out of the locality or into people’s homes.

    You’d see fights. People scrapping outside the pub you know you might get shouted at… But it was usually you’d be home for your tea by then… ‘Cos when I was a bit older I’d go myself. Not that much older mind you! (‘Sarah’, F, 1980s)

    This quote again demonstrates there was a tangible ‘danger’ alcohol culture posed to children, but that in the 1980s it didn’t much influence parenting practices in a society where drunkenness was normalised. For older children, underage drinking in pubs was also a means of communal socialising that tied them closer to their community and allowed for far more adult oversight than the subsequent drug culture. Indeed, for all Byker residents it was true that its communal drinking culture was important to community cohesion, which – I must emphasise – was critical to allowing the degree of childhood independence Byker saw in the 1980s. In moderate amounts alcohol itself helps facilitate social bonding, but more importantly it was a shared ritual in the community, facilitated by the communal environment of the pub.57 This is one reason why it is important to consider environment in these questions. Denise remembering that there was ‘a lot more pubs then’ emphasises the mixed legacy of that drinking culture.The venues were nexuses of connection for the community, providing ample opportunity for social drinking and reminiscences that would come to define Byker’s communal memory of its ship-building past. At the same time this culture led to increased incidents of public disorder and anti-social behaviour. For girls in particular, the regular presence of drunken men on the street each night contributed to their parents’ desire to get them home before dark.

    If it was time for dinner I could hear my mam calling, or some other kid would come calling.

    [and would you always go home, or would you ever disobey and stay out late?]

    Not really, not at that age. I’d be tired! But yeah my mam was more lenient with my brothers I think. (Susan, F, 1980s)

    Even if rules for boys and girls were the same on paper, the implementation or enforcement of those rules could still result in gender imbalance. Susan’s brothers were also expected to come home when called, but a more ‘lenient’ approach was adopted to the boys who were not understood to be implicitly in as much danger. Drinking culture played an important part in founding these fears, as drunken men did pose a real danger to teenage girls especially. These dangers shifted with environmental changes during the 1990s and 2000s – namely the closure of pubs and other ‘third places’, degradation of public spaces, and increase in car use. Drunkenness had moved into the home. Without community pubs (increasingly only those on Shields Road beyond the wall, across the busy road, and accessible to a much wider general public) the environment afforded fewer opportunities for social bonding. Fewer people walked the streets and over time a drunken person became more likely to be a stranger. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 1990s and 2000s saw a massive increase in public awareness and concern over domestic child abuse – sexual abuse in particular. However, as I have shown, that press attention largely portrayed abusers as one-off ‘monsters’ and thus avoided some of the trickier questions these incidents brought up around wider societal issues over the relationship between sexuality, masculinity, and power.58 In Byker none of the participants I talked to brought up domestic abuse as a factor of fear that caused children, parents, or the community to alter their restrictive practices, even with increasing levels of domestic drinking and the statistics clearly demonstrating how much more common domestic abuse was than attacks on children from strangers.

    The existing drinking culture in Byker made it easier for drugs to take root. What began as a community tradition of social drinking evolved into a more dangerous mix of alcohol and drugs, leading to increased addiction and related issues.

    In the 90s it went downhill, and people started getting access to stuff like that [drugs] more and more. But a lot of the drink came from, you know, it was our culture to drink. With the dads, and a lot of our lads got hooked on the drink, but then a lot of other stuff got mixed in with it. (Lynn, F, 1990s)

    Methadone and ecstasy grew massively in popularity during the 1990s in Byker as well as many other places across the country. Heroin and cocaine also grew in popularity and new ways were developed to take them. Whilst a national trend, certain areas were more affected than others, and Lynn’s quote shows how Byker’s drinking culture contributed to the foothold drug abuse gained in the community. Poverty, unemployment, and social atomisation played an even greater role however, as evidenced by the correlation between drug-abuse epidemics and working-class communities across the country.59 Indeed, Byker’s drinking culture was itself a vestige of its own working-class industrial heritage.

    Having fewer children and eyes on the street during the 1990s, as well as several abandoned buildings in the community like Bolam Coyne, allowed people to take drugs in public spaces where previously they would have not felt comfortable. This further stigmatised the public realm and the anti-social environment facilitated anti-social behaviour. Many participants described a ‘change’ that came over the neighbourhood with the introduction of drugs. For example, Michael recalled the absence of drugs during his youth in the 1980s, and their introduction during his teenage years:

    There wasn’t much in the way of nastiness between the kids. There was always fights, but there was no such thing as drugs, right? Just wasn’t there. I was about 15 or 16 before I would have heard of anybody with drugs. (Michael, M, 1980s)

    Drugs were a national concern during the 1980s when Michael was growing up but were not ‘felt’ in Byker by the participants I talked to until the 1990s. Largely this was due to changing perceptions around drugs with the advent of more socially acceptable forms of party drugs like Ecstasy and Ketamine.60 Thus, fears of ‘new’ forms of drug abuse that had begun growing during the 1980s began to fully manifest in the 1990s. Many participants who grew up around the turn of the 1990s described it as a ‘pivot point’ in time, marking the beginning of the end for Byker’s de-industrial community cohesion. Drug-abuse problems were both a contributing factor and a symptom of that degradation. Yvonne described a collective understanding in the community of the threats it faced:

    We felt the change in Byker, especially in the early 90s… a lot of drugs started hitting and the people started using pot, it felt like the start. The Byker Wall became a bit of a dumping ground, and that’s a horrible start with people. (Yvonne, F, 1990s)

    During the 1990s and 2000s council money was continually reduced for maintenance of the estate – the most expensive to maintain in the city – which further contributed to deterioration of the public realm, and consequently the morale and cohesion of the community.61 The prevalence of drug users and drug paraphernalia like discarded needles also made children more wary, for example, of crawling into bushes. Whilst walking along Gordon Road I asked Kate if she played much in Byker’s foliage growing up:

    We did yeah like hide and seek and that… but I wouldn’t dare now. There’s probably all sorts of stuff in there. (Kate, F, 2000s)

    Kate’s testimony and those of her contemporaries confirm that they did play out less than older generations, but the impression must not be taken that they stopped altogether. Rather, changes to the environment around them changed the balance of activity in their lives. Litter in the estate’s foliage as a reason for reduced outdoor play is an interesting case to examine because this had been a long-standing problem in New Byker. In earlier decades, children had used the estate’s shrubbery to hide and keep all sorts of materials and build dens. At that time adult residents had complained about this which is one of the reasons why the estate’s greenery was cut back.62

    In the 1990s for Byker Revisited Abrams talked to a woman called Nancy who told him that ‘The council did away with all the men who used to come around and clean the streets’, which allowed drug-users to leave their stuff lying about on the street for days and even weeks. They get their needles from … It’s just beside Shields Road… one time, they had mattresses, settees and everything around there you know… You were scared to go down the back’.63

    Drugs were not only seen as a hazard, however. Particularly for older children drugs offered a potentially enticing experience of escape and excitement that they could no longer get from unsupervised outdoor play. As Alan told me, the severe impacts of drug addictions that began in childhood lasted far beyond the 1990s and 2000s:

    It was going downhill, in the early 90s, it definitely took a nosedive pretty quick. And kids who I went to school with a lot of them died from drug and alcohol misuse. Loads of them. From the 100 kids that I know, I’ve been about 40 or 50 funerals. The most recent one was maybe last year one of the lads my age died of a heroin overdose. And he was an alcoholic for a lot of years. (Alan, M, 1980s)

    The North East region has the highest rate of drug-related deaths in England, with Byker having the highest rate within Newcastle.64 Alan’s quote again demonstrates how Byker’s social drinking culture contributed to its drug abuse epidemic. Furthermore, I argue, the unhealthy relationship that many Byker residents developed with drink and drugs during the 1990s and 2000s was environmentally stimulated. It is clear that the simple availability of a potentially dangerous substance does not inevitably lead to abuse of that substance.65 Rather, this comes when people find they have nowhere to go and nobody to turn to. Children in particular are a group with a unique lack of control over how and where they spend their time, and the testimonies I have collected lead me to conclude that many of them turned to dangerous activities in seek of excitement, independence, and community. Without the clear and predictable pathways into secure and reliable employment that had been at the centre of Old Byker’s industrial community, the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s saw a waning of socialised drinking culture in favour of a far more atomised drink and drugs culture. This contributed to shifts in perceptions of many areas in Byker from familiar to fearful with the most out-of-the-way and run-down environments attracting problem users, exacerbating existing economic and cultural pressures, degrading the public realm, discouraging (permittance of) outdoor play, and encouraging further dangerous behaviours.

    3.2.4 Pranks, Fights, and Crime: Children as Victims and Perpetrators of Destruction

    According to police statistics, the absolute crime rate in Britain peaked in 1995 before falling.66 This trend was true at the national and regional level, with Byker having one of the highest crime rates in the North East throughout this period.67 It is very likely that the increase in drug use on the estate partly contributed to the sharp increase in crime in Byker during the 1990s, largely through a rise in theft.68 The unpredictability and threat of drunken and drugged people on the streets deterred parents from allowing outdoor play in an increasingly safety-conscious society. Children were not only victims of these forces however, themselves being commonly involved in dangerous behaviour. In the 1980s loud and violent behaviour among men and boys was generally understood as a ‘fact of life’ in the community. David, for example, recounted the normalisation of fighting amongst young people:

    We were always fighting, and I thought it was fairly normal. But I really started realising that for a lot of people, it wasn’t. And for us it were because we were in that tiny little bubble so it was dead normal for us, but outside fears about it are something slightly different than what it was. It wasn’t violent and it wasn’t nasty. It was brilliant. (David, M, 1990s)

    When Michael said ‘there was no such thing as drugs’in the 1980s he also noted that ‘there was always fights’, casting it as a routine part of life. David remembered fondly a culture that saw it as play rather than genuine conflict. Behaviours that may have been considered problematic by outsiders were understood as normal, not problematic but symptomatic of a strong community. If the 1990s marked the beginning of a shift toward promoting child safety (at the unintentional expense of health), this is a great example of what parents were reacting against.

    Nobody was seriously hurt from fighting. There was a young kid killed just on our street there, where a car came through and got run over. But that was just playing hide and seek. (David, M, 1990s)

    Firstly, the acceptance of cars and their dangers is telling in David’s quote, supporting the argument that the physicality of cars and car infrastructure meant they quickly came to feel immutable, unchallengeable sources of danger. Secondly my interviews suggest that fighting was far more common in the earlier period of study in Byker, but because it was of the community it was not understood as a threat toward it. Further to this, as children spent less and less time outdoors together and fighting reduced, this was yet one more factor leading to the dissolution of communalism and eyes-on-the-street that previously had deterred serious violence taking place in such public spaces. ‘Jamie’ told me about a time, growing up in the early 2000s, that her home had been robbed by somebody she knew from the estate:

    There was one time. We got our windows broken in and stuff taken.

    [Interviewer] You got robbed?

    Yes, the TV the… and we knew who it was, yeah. It was a neighbour.

    [Interviewer] How did you know who it was?

    Because they’d taken stuff before, from other people. There was all loads of junk out the front as well. Their garden was, it was a tip. (‘Jamie’, F, 2000s)

    Community fragmentation created the social conditions wherein Jamie’s neighbour could commit this type of violence, providing more opportunity than in prior decades for people to commit such an act against those who lived so physically close to them.69

    This is not to say, however, that violent or nasty behaviour in earlier decades did not occur or was without negative consequence. The prevalence of fighting amongst Byker’s boys is testament to that. Rather, the nature and forms of violence changed over time, whereby increasingly Byker residents knew fewer of the other people who lived on the estate, and could therefore more easily view them as targets of suspicion or violence.70 The trend this thesis observes is a shrinking of the Byker ‘in-group’ over time and thus a growing number of people considered strangers, even if they live close by. This ‘strangerisation’ was especially important for children because it both fed and was fed by fears of stranger-danger. As I have argued, New Byker’s unclaimed liminal quality during its early years was one of the factors that made it such an excellent environment for children to adopt. During its early years then, children made up a central part of the New Byker ‘in-group’, and greater independent mobility led to outdoor play that helped to connect families within the neighbourhood. Over time reducing independent mobility contributed to the feelings of community distrust and decline that many participants described to me.

    However, whilst childhood play did overall function as a vector for community connection, children in the 1980s could also use their status as New Byker ‘insiders’ to exact forms of violence against those they considered outsiders. An especially badly treated group in the 1980s was the disabled. The negative consequences of a culture more accepting of dangerous behaviour can be seen in the stories relayed to me of pranks and abuse children would carry out against members of the public, who generally were singled out for having some kind of mental or physical difference. In this way, children became forces of destruction in the environment by making spaces feel unsafe and vandalising property. Alan described some ‘characters’ of Byker in the 1980s that many children enjoyed ‘tormenting’. These ‘characters’ were thought about by the children as people who were curious or funny in some way, and they would give them nicknames.

    You’ll see all kinds of stuff going on. But we had people around here and there one was called Jackie Shite-er. And he would get called ‘a half a dwarf’… if you got a chance to see Jackie you’d shout ‘Jackie Shite-er! Jackie Shite-er!’ And you know what? He was fast so he would run after all you chasing you. (Alan, M, 1980s)

    This was a rough-and-tumble social environment wherein the line between harmless fun and abusive behaviour was blurred and often crossed. Another figure was treated similarly:

    And there was Jimmy the brick. When he was born, one leg was shorter than usual, right? So that’s the thing what they did was to give him a special pair of shoes, you know, in the bottom of the shoe, they got this big bit of wood. So that was the brick that was the thing. And he would chase you as well. (Alan, M, 1980s)

    New Byker’s environment facilitated these interactions as its car-lite spaces were friendly to all people who didn’t or couldn’t drive, including children and many disabled people as well as the general proportion of Byker’s population at this time who did not own a car.71 Testimonies of such ‘characters’ and the taunting of them reduced significantly throughout the period of study. Children spending less free time outdoors is one evident reason for this, but the other is that adults were affected similarly. In a car-oriented world with growing distances between amenities it became increasingly impractical to walk places – and this posed even more of a barrier to many with physical or mental differences. The mention of Byker’s ‘characters’ to other participants brought out further colourful stories and descriptions, and it became clear that these characters were well-known by children throughout the community.

    Sandshoes Sam, he was just a bloke, older guy, who used to go running at night… But we all had these theories about Sandshoes Sam… We’d say ‘oh you better be careful or Sandshoes Sam will get you’, but he was just a bloke who was out exercising. But for some reason it got into everybody’s head that Sandshoes Sam was some kind of child abductor or something. (Denise, F, 1980s)

    This testimony demonstrates how societal and parental fears over ‘stranger-danger’ manifested themselves within Byker’s childhood culture. Indeed, the general childhood fascination with – and antagonism towards – people in the community who stood-out in some way clearly reflects the public messaging of the period surrounding this moral panic. As detailed in Chapter Two of this thesis, media portrayals of ‘the stranger’ generally portrayed the figure as strange, ugly, or otherwise unusual. Such perceptions had real consequences as Shelley remembered:

    Poor guy [‘Sandshoes Sam’]. He would have his windows smashed, multiple times, yes, kids threw rocks through his window. I feel so bad for him, because probably he hadn’t even done anything. (Shelley, F, 1980s).

    The victim in this case was perceived within Byker’s childhood culture of the 1980s as a sort of bogeyman because he stood out in a way deemed menacing. Notably, he did not have a disability the children were aware of meaning that any ‘outsider’ in the community could become a target. Meanwhile other ‘characters’ were seen more warmly and were left relatively alone:

    We would see Kung Fu Geordie on Commercial Road. Yeah. And he used to karate chop the busses. Yeah! The number 34, and the busses used to just continue on… I don’t know whether it was drink or mental health problems, but it was something going on with him and everyone would see it. (Amanda, F, 1980s)

    On the one hand this recollection and many of the others like it are clearly fond ones. Evidently, the participants felt a sense of loss for a time when you would see people more often out in the community, including those with physical or mental differences that so interested many children. When Alan told me that ‘you’ll never ever see those type of characters again ever, they’re gone’ it was clear he felt it was a shame that Byker’s environment no longer supported those sorts of interactions. On the other hand, these characters were often persecuted by the children, from rumour-spreading and name-calling, to smashing windows. Whilst those children who were part of an in-group were brought together by these acts, ultimately, they damaged the fabric of the community. Furthermore, all the participants who remembered being involved with pranks, taunts, and fights as children said that they would now discourage their own sons and daughters from the same behaviour.

    In later decades, as all people but especially those with physical and mental differences were increasingly isolated from one another, stories of their ‘torment’, as Alan described it, stopped. However, the influx of new residents to the estate during this time provided a new group of ‘strangers’ to fear. From the mid-1990s onwards the council increasingly decided to house new, often troubled residents in the Byker Wall, which had free flats available. This influx led to tensions between long-term residents and newcomers, contributing to a sense of displacement and instability within the community. As Yvonne explained:

    They would put people in there, and the good people that were inside felt like they were getting forced away. (Yvonne, F, 1990s)

    The expansion of the estate’s diversity was not only due to the council rehoming people but also global migration patterns and Newcastle’s designation as an ‘Asylum Seeker Dispersal Point’ in 1999, with 70 housing units in Byker allocated to asylum seekers in the first year.72 Mallinson’s 2006 interviews with asylum seekers and council staff reveal that Byker was seen from the outside as an unwelcoming place for new immigrants, a support worker commenting that ‘they haven’t had a big population of ethnic minorities before and locals aren’t used to seeing people from different countries in their streets’.73 One migrant living in Newcastle’s West End (another neighbourhood with a proportionally large migrant population) said ‘It is ok here. Better than Byker – that’s a racist area’.74 These sources speak to the tensions that the introduction of these new populations introduced to the community during a period when it was already experiencing high levels of crime, stress, and social fragmentation due to de-industrialisation and the other factors outlined in this thesis. However, a lack of source material with testimonies from asylum seekers who did live in Byker during this period means it is difficult to assess the extent to which the outside perception of racism matched reality. The focus of my thesis and the means by which I sourced participants means I did not speak to any Byker residents who had been asylum seekers but would mark this as a point for future oral history research. The testimonies I did collect did not mention race specifically, but some identified the arrival of new people to the estate as a factor in the decline of its street sociability. Certainly many residents felt that a whole host of factors were driving strangerisation, accelerating neoliberal processes of social atomisation.

    People from outside coming in. And then it’s not just outsiders coming in from different areas, people from inside doing it [crime] as well. But they all kind of were in a bit of a perfect storm in the middle of it all. (Lynn, F, 1990s)

    This ‘perfect storm’ was created by the combination of economic, environmental, and social issues that increasingly plagued Byker during this period. Some new residents, some of whom were former prisoners, did exacerbate these problems. Many participants described to me new people who would move in and have no pride in their home or the community, demonstrated by the poor state they would keep their house and garden in. At the same time, it is clear new residents were generally not made to feel part of the existing community.

    However, despite reduction in the strength of community relationships, Byker did not undergo as complete a transformation as many participants articulated. Even though the youngest participants interviewed acknowledged a diminished sense of community in Byker, they still believed that many people in the community were familiar to them:

    I think a lot of people work outside Byker, so I see my neighbours like once a month if that, like you don’t see a lot of people when you’re working full time, so I think that’s kind of, like me grandma didn’t work full time, it’s different times. (‘Jamie’, F, 2000s)

    ‘There’s a good community here, on this balcony, everyone’s looking out for each other. I can’t say about the rest of the estate though, I don’t really know about that, I don’t go there.’ (Dan, M, 2000s)

    These testimonies suggest that a sense of community persisted in Byker, albeit in a different form than that experienced by older generations. Clearly, the community was fractured by multiple interlocking forces of strangerisation, the key factors discussed in this section being: De-industrialisation and unemployment, loss of shops and pubs, crime, drink and drugs, neoliberal atomisation, and cars. The nostalgia shown by some participants therefore is a valid expression of loss for a positive aspect of the Byker community which declined, and a call for it to change again. As Stack said:

    No one, however nostalgic, is really seeking to turn back the clock… What people are seeking is not so much the home they left behind as a place they feel they can change.75

    3.3 Construction: Finding Space for Play on the Fringes

    3.3.1 Climbing: Play That Requires Attentiveness to Environment

    One persistent example of the competing values placed on different environments between children and adults in Byker was the practice of climbing, particularly onto roofs. Compared to Old Byker, New Byker provided opportunity in abundance for climbing on roofs due to the many single-story low slanting roofs within the estate, and most participants I talked to across the decades described doing so.76 In addition, New Byker featured an assortment of street furniture that invited climbing:

    They would build these like shelter things… Them to us, it was like an adventure playground, so we would climb on them all. So you could [go] up into Byker and you could just climb on walls, structures, things. Yeah, roofs, all kinds of stuff! Anything that you can climb on. We were climbers in that era, they don’t climb as much these days people are scared about it. So that’s what we would do, we’d go in there and it was just the best place. (Alan, M, 1980s)

    Figure XIII. Alley leading to roof with bicycle (middle), and raised fence (left), Spires Lane.77

    Figure XIV. Two ‘Shelter Things’ on Laverock Court.78

    A letter written to Erskine from 1972 noted that:

    The rainwater pipes especially in public areas are subject to vandalism… concrete plinths to which the foot of the pipes are attached only encourage children to climb onto them, these children then pull on the pipe and in consequence the top of the pipe is pulled away from the nozzle outlet on the eaves gutter.79

    In conducting the walking interviews, one of the most common memories the environment would induce in participants would be ‘we used to climb on this’. Despite the estate’s loss of trees and structures over time, Byker today still invites the prospect, with its bright colours and unique street furniture, and so invites the memories too. Climbing memories are special, as Alan identifies, because climbing is an activity that necessitates engaging intimately with an environment. Climbing rewards the attentive climber with access to a space from which you can feel safe and secluded – even hidden – whilst simultaneously being central and overlooking others, which are environmental characteristics that children often value.80 In this way an environment creates a set of challenges for young people, which is magnified when together in groups: ‘Do you think you could hang on that upside down?’, ‘I bet you couldn’t climb up there’, ‘watch this jump’. By this mechanism, the Byker environment shaped its young people into a generation of ‘climbers’, as Alan defined it. At the same time Alan’s description of ‘going in’ to Byker is telling of its insular design that would ultimately leave its children disconnected from the wider city. He lived in Byker in a Victorian terrace that had not been demolished on St Peter’s Road, yet he clearly conceived of New Byker as a place apart – somewhere that had to be entered.

    We all used to climb round here and play round here and play ‘Tuggy on High’ and that round here… You had to climb up high [mimes the climb] so nobody could tug you and if you got down and they tugged you then you were out [laughs]. The mad games we used to play… (Lisa, F, 1990s)

    The act of the walking interview was an excellent tool for eliciting climbing memories, where the space itself provided the prompt for recollection and even recreation. Adults rarely wander around a place like children do, but the interview provided a facsimile of that experience where there is no clear destination or purpose of direction. The possibility of playing with or exploring the place in more unusual ways becomes more inviting in this context and climbing up walls and onto roofs less unthinkable.

    Roof spaces, like abandoned buildings, can be attractive to children because they also qualify as liminal spaces. In contrast to a rubble heap, however, they are vacant but still owned, and this is another example of where the contrasting environmental values of adults and children came into conflict. All the participants who described roof-climbing knew that it was ‘wrong’ and that they risked getting told off for it, but the rewards – to them – were worth it. Parents were concerned that children would damage the roof, injure themselves, or make annoying noise, but these were not considered ‘problems’ in the same way by the children. Indeed, the ‘improper’ use of Byker’s environment was a fundamental pillar of its appeal, and a core memory for many of those interviewed. As such it is little surprise that the slow removal of climbing structures like shelters and trees – and the increased policing of the space with fences, anti-climb paint, and CCTV cameras – reduced the desirability of the outdoors to children over time. This can be attributed as part of the reason why those interviewed who grew up in the 1990s and 2000s described climbing in terms of individual events rather than as a general culture:

    One time we climbed up there, yeah, cos’ it’s like big steps all the way up. So yeah we just climbed on the roof, just to see, you know? Just to look around. I remember we all thought we’d got seen so we ran down and [John], me friend [John], he cut himself on the fence. Cos’ there was this big fence because it was abandoned. (Andy, M, 2000s)

    Figure XV. Bolam Coyne in 2008, the building Andy described climbing.81

    This demonstrates the shift in understanding that took place amongst Byker’s kids whereby the act of climbing moved from something that the environment invited to something it discouraged. The nostalgia of older participants for the more climbable era of their youth is therefore a manifestation of personal and community memory acting to shape the present and future of the estate. This may be understood as a practical example of the ‘nostalgic progressivism’ concept I outlined in Chapter One..

    This said, it must also be acknowledged that the challenges of nostalgic memory as a source still remain, namely in that there is a strong tendency for individuals and a community to ‘universalise’ childhood experience in recollections. For example, many participants talked about how they no longer saw contemporary children climbing as they did:

    It wouldn’t cross their minds to try I don’t think, to try and climb up a roof or go sledging down something in a black box somewhere or you know… everything’s a bit more organised for them and a bit more thought about a bit more. I do not think they think to ask permission more than I would have done. Which is quite different. (Shelley, F, 1980s)

    This framing of change in children’s behaviour is founded in the truth of decline in outdoor free play but does not encapsulate the full story. Evidently, climbing has not (and really cannot) be totally wiped out as a practice, as evidenced by the presence of anti-climb measures across the estate today. Fences, spikes, signs, CCTV, and anti-climb paint are the environmental manifestation of the barriers put in place over time that have contributed to less climbing, alongside cultural barriers. These preventative measures also show us that whether they climb or not, it certainly does ‘cross the minds’ of certain children to try.

    Figure XII. ‘Warning. Anti-Climb Paint’.82

    Whilst it is the case that everyone I spoke to described climbing memories, it was noticeable that boys recollected a greater sense of ownership over the ‘best’ climbing spots than girls. For example, whereas Alan described how he and his friends ‘had’ certain spots where they could sit ‘for hours’, Shelley described climbing as a briefer and more contingent activity because boys had an assumed right to the space that girls didn’t.

    Now just on the back of [St. Peter’s Church]… there was this big tree, and there was no phones and we just used to sit and talk and make stories up and tell each other, and we would be there for hours. (Alan, M , 1980s)

    Me and Tina would climb up this big tree, like shimmy along the branch. Yeah, I think and then go down. You would like sneak down ‘cos them [parents] sitting in the garden would shout if they saw you. So, yeah. I think there was just complete freedom to do whatever you wanted to do. (Shelley, F, 1980s)

    The contradiction in Shelley’s assertion of ‘complete freedom’ alongside getting shouted at for climbing a tree reveals that general structures of feeling about a childhood can be complicated by looking at specific stories from it. Freedom, although greater in many aspects than in later decades, was not total – especially for girls. Indeed, Thomson’s work on post-war generations tells us that British children’s independence had already been in decline for decades prior.83 Memories of being shouted at and chased did not necessarily clash with the concept of freedom in the minds of participants because they were viewed as unserious. By this I mean that getting told off (or the danger of it) was often ‘part of the fun’. However, it is also true that rule-breaking in earlier decades contributed in part to more policing and restrictions over climbing in later ones. Another activity whose popularity prompted adults to alter Byker’s environment to discourage it was den-building.

    3.3.2 Dens and Weather

    From the inception of New Byker there was a tension between the desires of its adult and child residents. In their consultations with Erskine’s team, residents wrote that they wanted to extend fencing to include shrubbed areas flanking the footpaths. The architects wrote in response: ‘we feel visually this would be a pity, but if it means that beds get well maintained, it is probably worthwhile’. The opportunity for more privacy was quite readily taken by residents. However, sometimes the architects elected not to change things, and to carry on as planned. Justifying the level of enclosure of private gardens or yards, they continued to find ‘the general standard of privacy and enclosure reasonable. It was discussed with the tenants at the time.’ The front garden fences were not in all instances re-designed, and play spaces were still constructed in other parts of the estate. The result was an environment of compromise between planners and adult residents. Children – considered but not consulted – found ways to occupy this environment in ways unexpected to both adult parties. Often the liminal in-between spaces that many young people found interest in were those that had been comparatively overlooked in the design process.

    When they built this they put a lot of greenery in and bushes everywhere. But there’s not as many these days they seem to be a lot lower than what it was, but when they first put them in, we just hid stuff in them constantly. (Susan, F, 1980s)

    There used to be a little industrial area just outside of the estate… and every now and then out the back there’d be these big bins, and there’d be stuff that they just would put out and me and Carl would, like, nick all of it… and if we didn’t know what to do with the contraband that we’d nicked out of the bins we’d put them in our den that we’d built. And it was just something in the bushes that you’d, like, find a hollow and you’d hollow it out even more and then you’d just sit in there and just play. (Shelley, F, 1980s)

    Old Byker’s de-industrial half-life, in the form of industrial units on New Byker’s periphery, provided Shelley with the materials for den-building. As the years went on and this latent industry declined so did the available material. At the same time the cutting back of bushes observed by Susan limited their usefulness as sites for den construction by curtailing their ability to provide privacy. These two factors that conspired to give Byker fewer enticing places for den building came from very different sources. The closure of peripheral industrial sites was part of a long-running trend on Tyneside accelerated in the national context by Thatcherism and a broad neoliberal shift away from a manufacturing to services economy. Conversely the uprooting and cutting back of bushes was a local issue largely brought about by the cost of their maintenance to the council and complaints from residents about young people using them to hide scrap for dens and fires. As dens do not necessitate the use of scrap, I would argue the local environmental factor was the more crucial in this case.

    Eventually when the estate was all built. The wall completed and then landscaped it was absolutely beautiful. Honestly, it was lots of green shrubs around, you know? Yeah. Lovely scenario. If you look, you know, we’ve still got trees and that but, I mean, it’s not the same. (Bill, M, 1990s)

    Bill’s memory for Byker’s greener past is interesting as he was a child of the 1990s, growing up at a time when cutbacks had already begun. In part, his feeling draws upon a collective memory of New Byker’s inception and, in part, it reflects a time of slow transition from abundance in den-building sites to scarcity. Bill’s note that Byker has ‘still got trees’ demonstrates the importance of a qualitative analysis of human-environment interaction. The quantity of trees and shrubs around was not as significant as the management of them in their qualitative value to young people.

    Thickets of leafy shrubs provided interest to some of Byker’s children largely because they opportunity for creative independent play and, crucially, privacy. When those same shrubs were thinned or cut back, they longer did so. ‘Sarah’ gave me a similar example:

    There was this big playing field where everybody played, right here before they built the motorway, and this is where we’d stand. And it’s a little bit, like, secluded, so it was a good place to hide away down here. (‘Sarah’, F, 1980s)

    The field in question had been slated to become a motorway from New Byker’s inception. Indeed, it was the reason for the Byker Wall’s existence as a shield against it. When the large road was built (whilst not an officially designated motorway) it divided the neighbourhood and produced noise and air pollution. In the in-between period after The Wall was constructed but before the road was built, children occupied that unclaimed land. Because the temporary green space was never intended to be a public space it was not well integrated into New Byker’s plan and therefore became the ‘secluded’ place that younger and older children could use to ‘hide away’ for a brief time before construction began.

    Sarah’s assertion that ‘everybody’ played on the field, and that of ‘complete freedom’ that many participants recalled, is however in conflict with other stories they told of breaking rules and being told off. This was especially true for girls who had more parental and social expectations around their behaviour. With football for example it was very clear that, by-and-large, the boys played whilst the girls watched. Whilst it could be said with a cursory assessment that both girls and boys took part in football, a more granular analysis shows they did not have equal experience.

    When I look back it was idyllic because we had our freedom, whereas I wouldn’t let my grandchildren do half the things I did. I mean climbing on roofs or climbing trees and things like that: ‘boys should do that’ or ‘girls should do that’. They should be put into certain dangers so that they can learn. But you know the way the law is now you cannot do that (Val, F, 1980s)

    It was very, very rare. You saw a lass at a match… The girls got dolls and prams to play with. We got things that you would call boy stuff: footballs, bats, tennis rackets (Michael, M, 1980s)

    In 1984 the National Playing Fields Association described the adventure playground movement – a posterchild for post-war British childhood playscapes – as having been ‘dominated by boys’.84 The nostalgia shown by many of the women interviewed for a more egalitarian time is complicated by such details. The concept of ‘everyone knowing everyone’ and playing out together irrespective of gender (or indeed race, class, etc.), was not the case. However, that does not mean there was no truth to these testimonies. Indeed, this research also finds that there was an increased segregation of boys’ and girls’ play from 1980 through to 2010. Toy culture provides an example in the national context. In the decades leading up to the 1980s, influenced by second-wave feminist movements across the country, Britain saw a push toward gender-neutral clothing, toys, and activities for children. However, with the explosion of children’s TV advertising and the birth of the ‘pink princess’ and ‘blue action man’ tropes of the 1990s much of toy culture again adopted more segregated gender stereotypes. As Sweet discovered, in America the 1975 Sears catalogue used gendered marketing for less than 2% of its toys, whereas that figure had risen to 50% in 1995.85 In Byker specifically, the testimony I heard suggested that the younger a participant, the more likely it was that they had spent a period of their childhood playing only or largely with others of their gender.

    I had more [friends who were boys] when I was little, but then you just kind of separate out don’t you? And then you become interested again. (‘Rebecca’, F, 2000s)

    Rebecca’s more atomised childhood experience is one narrativised by older participants as a prime example of degradation from an earlier more social form. However, this change in the commonality of intermingling was brought about by environmental changes that, particularly from the perspective of adult residents, were desirable for the purposes of ‘refining’ the neighbourhood. As the ‘secret’ spaces where undesirable forms of play took place were curtailed, the estate could be seen to be being brought closer to its original concept; a more settled environment where spaces for children’s play were better designated and controlled. However, environmental and testimonial clues tell us that perfect separation of space by function (play, work, transport) was not achieved. Indeed, nature was constantly at work to frustrate or enhance human designs. In particular, the factor of weather stood out as especially significant for this thesis as a natural force with a unique quality to radically alter the environment:

    You got up in the morning and if you weren’t at school it was just like ‘get out the house’ go out and play… If it was raining, you put your wellies on… and you went out and you got wet. If it was snowing you went out and you got cold, you come in, got warm, went out again. (Val, F, 1980s)

    Many participants of earlier decades described a culture of playing out whatever the weather, including some children of the 1990s. This did not mean that weather was irrelevant to the children, rather that it was not perceived as an obstacle. Instead, rain, wind, and snow could provide opportunities for new forms of exploration and play. Snow most obviously alters a landscape, but rain and wind also do so in the form of puddles, slides, kites, fallen branches, floods etc. Importantly weather also facilitated new sensory experiences that do not strictly fall into the category of ‘play’: leaning into the wind, the sounds and smells of a thunderstorm, or the cold and quiet wonder of snowfall. Such strong sensational memories were often sparked in the walking interviews by a turn in the weather.

    When it was raining and windy like this you’d still just go out. We would go out in every single weather type. (Dan, M, 1990s)

    Again, the tendency to universalise childhood experiences of the community is present in these testimonials, but that it was at least not uncommon to go out unsupervised in ‘bad’ weather is the key point of interest here. By 2000 new parents were hesitant to allow it – bad weather increasingly seen as another reason (on top of the more significant factors discussed at length in this thesis) to restrict their children’s independent mobility on grounds of health and safety. Most of all this could be seen in the remarks of participants who grew up in earlier decades and had since become parents:

    Doesn’t really happen these days… the school closed due to snow and we’d just be out playing for as long we could, and you might not even have a pair of gloves. (Michael, M, 1980s)

    We used to like going down to the river, er, swimming, even though it was probably stinking. Remember coming home from the river once just soaking wet, ‘cos you would just go in with your clothes on… You would be out all day, I wouldn’t dream of letting my kids do that! (Amanda, F, 1980s)

    Participants of later decades did not describe playing out in rain, wind, or snow with as much persistence as their parents’ generations. In part, this is because they were not allowed to. In many cases parents of the 2000s successfully protected their children from dangers they risked themselves when they were younger. After all, the river Ouseburn that Amanda described playing in was (and continues to be) quite polluted and by playing out in the snow without gloves Michael was tempting frostbite. The trade-offs were that by imposing restrictions parents limited opportunities for Byker’s young people to exert the independence and creativity often necessitated to endure or overcome obstacles and hardships. To replace those opportunities, Byker residents turned towards new toys, games, and technologies alongside reliance on private garden space and timetabled sports and activities. For example Bill told me about a summer activities club that parents set up during the 1990s:

    Trips in the minibus, we hired it and we’d all get a lovely day off to Whitley Bay… we had a big trampoline brought in just out there. (Bill, M, 1990s)

    Such trips and activities were remembered fondly by participants, but cost parents time and money to orchestrate in replacement for forms of play that had previously been ‘free’ in both senses of the word. Adults were driven by the environmental changes around cars and landscaping discussed in this chapter to replace their children’s unsupervised outdoor play with supervised play. Also, in part, cultural attitudes had changed following stranger-danger and anti-social youth fears. The Ouseburn did not get more dangerous over this period (rather less) but still it became seen to be more dangerous. The weather (though of course fundamentally variable by its nature) did not significantly worsen, yet it came to be perceived as a greater obstacle. In the context of growing suspicion and wariness of ‘the outdoors’, once minor obstacles compounded existing fears. Over the studied 30 years the cultures of parenting and community had changed in Byker, and a new identity of what it meant to be a ‘child of Byker’ was forming.

    3.4 Conclusion: Children as Sociological Explorers

    In Deindustrialisation and the Historical Sociological Imagination, Strangleman utilises Thompson’s analysis of industrialising societies to better comprehend de-industrialising ones.86 By emphasising Thompson’s attention to the real-life experiences of industrialisation and his understanding that individuals could only utilise their own past knowledge to comprehend and navigate these changes, Strangleman highlights the limitations of the tendency to view the past as discrete time periods, which can obscure the processes of transition.87 With Byker the destruction of the Old and construction of the New could make this trap all too easy to fall in to. However, as this chapter has shown through its analysis of children’s intimate negotiations with changing space, from the very beginning New Byker was an environment of transition and change. Old Byker’s half-life, new national developments, local economic, social, and infrastructural change, and the opinions and actions of its citizens all shaped New Byker. Byker’s children – those residents least expected to be bound to the past – found their daily lives entangled with industrial legacy through environment and culture. Furthermore, some children acted as key sociological explorers during this period, forming and binding new communities and finding environments of play in a world of ever-tightening restrictions on their mobility.

    The testimonies in this chapter have elucidated key forms of interaction between environment and child in a de-industrial, North East, 1980-2010 context. The use of demolition and construction as sites for exploration, sliding down rubble heaps, and setting fires. Building dens and gathering materials from legacy light-industrial sites on the fringes of the estate. Hiding away and making use of land scheduled to be developed or otherwise left untended by the adults. Fighting, playing pranks, and other forms of behaviour that often turned dangerous or anti-social. Utilising the geography of the old street-pattern for wheeling downhill. Climbing on rooves and trees and taking advantage of the opportunities for environmental transformation brought on by weather. These are instances where Byker’s environment invited children to explore new forms of play, but at the same time these alternative utilisations of space often came into conflict with the adult world, and this is when measures like taller fences, spikes, and CCTV cameras were taken to curtail activities like den-making, climbing, and setting fires. As fears for and of children grew across the period, the scope of outdoor play testimonials reduced. Beyond these localised changes, national trends were also making themselves felt in Byker, as rising car numbers, stranger-danger fear, street drink and drug culture, local shop closures, and a growing safety-conscious culture of individualism made it no longer conscionable for parents to let their children play as freely as prior generations. All these factors eroded community cohesion, reducing child mobility, which in turn reduced social connectivity in a vicious cycle of restriction and isolation.88

    Whilst the reasons for decline in outdoor play in this context are therefore clear, the testimonies herein have also demonstrated that all the forms of outdoor play discussed in this chapter persisted throughout the period – though evolved. Participants across the decades expressed similar childhood values and desires towards things like secrecy, novelty, danger, and ownership. In a changing environmental, economic, and social landscape, these desires were met in different ways, increasingly through technology and timetabled activities as part of a national ‘inward turn’ in child-rearing approaches away from public space and toward private ones. In an urban context of little garden and yard space this left many with few places to turn. Erskine’s green, low-rise, and car-lite modernist design for New Byker might have been expected to become a posterchild neighbourhood that resisted the national and regional trend of decline in outdoor interaction and social atomisation. A key reason it didn’t was its failure to comprehend and integrate children as equal users of the entire space, imagining they would stay confined to designated playground areas, upsetting residents when they didn’t, and then not maintaining those areas over time or converting them into car parks. It is somewhat ironic therefore that New Byker so resembled a giant playground. An environment that beckoned to be explored but increasingly told children that they should not.

    <- Chapter 2 – Chapter 4 ->

    References

    1 Michael Dradge, ‘Byker: Surprising the Colleagues for 35 Years. A Social History of Ralph Erskine’s Arkitektkontor AB in Newcastle,’ Twentieth Century Architecture 9 (2008): 150.

    2 Mats Egelius, ‘Ralph Erskine : Byker Redevelopment, Byker Area of Newcastle upon Tyne, England, 1969-82,’ Global Architecture 55 (1980): 40.

    3 Robin Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ Built Environment 29 (2003): 117.

    4 Dradge, ‘Byker: Surprising the Colleagues for 35 Years,’ 156.

    5 Peter Malpass, ‘The other side of the wall,’ Architect’s Journal (May 1979): 964.

    6 Ibid, 966.

    7 Sirkka-Liisa Konttinen, ‘Carville Road at Night (Byker),’ photograph, 1971. Tate Gallery Archive.

    8 Louis Holland Bonnett, ‘Byker 1970,’ JPG map, February 2024, Digimap Ordinance Survey Collection.

    9 ‘Where to Live in Byker?,’ Byker Community Trust , accessed 25 March 2024, https://bykercommunitytrust.org/properties/.

    10 Louis Holland Bonnett, ‘Byker 1980,’ JPG map, February 2024, Digimap Ordinance Survey Collection.

    11 Alison Ravetz, ‘Housing at Byker, Newcastle upon Tyne,’ Architects’ Journal 15 (April 1976): 7; Portmeiron is a village in Wales built in the 20th century to resemble a Mediterranean village.

    12 Mary Comeiro, ‘Design and Empowerment: 20 Years of Community Architecture,’ Built Environment 13 (1987): 61.

    13 Elain Harwood, ‘Post-War Landscape and Public Housing,’ Garden History 28 (2000): 114; See also Dan Kerr, ‘We can still learn from Byker’s inclusive design ethos,’ RIBA Journal (October 2019).

    14 See the child’s absence from such assorted works as: Heidi Svenningsen Kajita, ‘Urgent Minor Matters: Re-Activating Archival Documents for Social Housing Futures,’ Architecture and Culture (2022): 483; Malpass, ‘The other side of the wall,’ 964; Rosalind Kain, ‘Is Byker Heritage? : a Study of the Residents’ Value of Byker’s Post-War Architecture and Their Support for Its Conservation,’ (PhD diss., University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2003); Peter Blundell Jones and Eamonn Canniffe, Modern Architecture Through Case Studies 1945 to 1990 (Elsevier, 2007); Mats Egelius, ‘Ralph Erskine : Byker Redevelopment, Byker Area of Newcastle upon Tyne, England, 1969-82,’ Global Architecture 55 (1980); Robin Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ Built Environment 29 (2003).

    15 Dradge, ‘Byker: Surprising the Colleagues for 35 Years,’ 152.

    16 Ibid, 154.

    17 Ibid, 154; Nageen Mustafa et al., ‘An Exploration of the Historical Background of Criminal Record Checking in the United Kingdom: From the Eighteenth to the Twenty-First Century,’ European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 19 (2013): 23.

    18 Louis Holland Bonnett, ‘Byker 1980,’ JPG map, February 2024, Digimap Ordinance Survey Collection.

    19 ‘Where to Live in Byker?.’

    20 Ralph Erskine and Lars Harald Westman, An Ecological Arctic Town, 1958, Gouache and Pencil on Print, ArkDes Collections ARKM.

    21 ‘Where to Live in Byker?.’

    22 Dradge, ‘Byker: Surprising the Colleagues for 35 Years,’ 161.

    23 Robin Abrams, ‘Byker: An assessment,’ Landscape Design 142 (1983): 10.

    24 Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ 126.

    25 William Cronon, ‘The Trouble with Wilderness; Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,’ Environmental History 1 (1996): 76.

    26 MacPherson, ‘Regenerating industrial riversides in the north east of England,’ in Urban Waterside Regeneration: Problems and Prospects, ed. K.N. White (Harwood, London: 1993), 32.

    27 Hattersley, ‘Byker threatened,’ Building Design 141 (1999): 4.

    28 Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ 128.

    29 Ibid, 129.

    30 Tony Henderson, ‘Awards for iconic flats; New life for 1960s and ’70s landmarks,’ The Free Library, accessed 27 March 2024, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Awards+for+iconic+flats%3b+New+life+for+1960s+and+%2770s+landmarks.-a0288222027.

    31 Louis Holland Bonnett, ‘Society Digimap: Byker,’ Digital map, March 2024, Digimap Ordinance Survey Collection.

    32 Peter Blundell Jones and Eamonn Canniffe, Modern Architecture Through Case Studies 1945 to 1990 (Elsevier, 2007), 172.

    33 Stephanie Schoeppe et al., ‘Socio-Demographic Factors and Neighbourhood Social Cohesion Influence Adults’ Willingness to Grant Children Greater Independent Mobility: A Cross-Sectional Study,’ BMC Public Health 15 (2015), 2.

    34 Sarah Moser, ‘Personality: a new positionality?,’ Area 40(2008): 383.

    35 Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Practices in Principle (Routledge: London, 2007), 64.

    36 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 51.

    37 Ibid, 53.

    38 Heidi Svenningsen Kajita, ‘Urgent Minor Matters: Re-Activating Archival Documents for Social Housing Futures,’ Architecture and Culture (2022): 491.

    39 Katie Schmuecker, ‘Social Capital in the North East,Institute for Public Policy

    Research North (2008): 6.

    40 Gary Pattison, ‘Planning for decline: the “D” ‐ village policy of County Durham, UK,’ Planning Perspectives 19 (2004): 312.

    41 Ibid, 329.

    42 BFI Player, Byker Song, https://player.bfi.org.uk/free/film/watch-byker-song-1974-online.

    43 Sherry Lee Linkon, The Half-Life of Deindustrialization: Working-Class Writing about Economic Restructuring (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), 95.

    44 Mah, Industrial Ruination, Community, and Place, 201.

    45 T. Strangleman, ‘Deindustrialisation and the Historical Sociological Imagination: Making Sense of Work and Industrial Change,’ Sociology 51 (2018): 476.

    46 Sarah Glynn, ‘Good Homes: lessons in public housing from Byker,’ in Byker: Newcastle upon Tyne (2011), 6.

    47 Rosalind Kain, Is Byker Heritage? A Study of the Residents’ Value of Byker’s Post-War Architecure and Their Support for Its Conservation (Thesis: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2003).

    48 Richard Collier, ‘“Rat Boys” and “Little Angels”: Corporeality, Male Youth and The Bodies Of (Dis) Order,’ in Contested bodies (Routledge, 2003), 31.

    49 Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited’ Built Environment 29, no. 2(2003): 126.

    50 Nicola Crosby, ‘Crime Report 1998 to 2002,’ Tyne & Wear Research and Information (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: 2004), 10.

    51 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 30; Linkon, The Half-Life of Deindustrialization.

    52 Louis Holland Bonnett, photograph, Byker, December 2023.

    53 RAC Foundation, ‘Car ownership rates per local authority in England and Wales,’ RAC Foundation, 26 December 2012, https://www.racfoundation.org/assets/rac_foundation/content/downloadables/car%20ownership%20rates%20by%20local%20authority%20-%20december%202012.pdf.

    54 Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ Built Environment 29 (2003): 128.

    55 SiteLines, ‘Byker Redevelopment,’ Newcastle City Council, https://sitelines.newcastle.gov.uk/SMR/16463.

    56 Louis Holland Bonnett, photograph, Byker, December 2023.

    57 Sayette et al., ‘Alcohol and Group Formation: A Multimodal Investigation of the Effects of Alcohol on Emotion and Social Bonding,’ Psychological Science 23 (2012), 869.

    58 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), 194.

    59 A. O’Gorman, Drug problems and social exclusion: The development of heroin careers in risk environments (Middlesex University: PhD thesis, 2011), 1-3.

    60 Peder Clark, ‘Ecstasy’s Risks and Pleasures in Britain, 1985–2000,’ (Edinburgh: Centre for the Social History of Health and Healthcare, 2024), II.

    61 Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ 126.

    62 Glynn, ‘Good Homes,’ 6.evidence

    63 Abrams, ‘Byker Revisited,’ 117.

    64 Newcastle City Council and Northumbria Police, Newcastle Drug Market Profile: Project ADDER Analytical Hub Report, February 2023, 107.

    65 Kenneth Silverman, Drug Abuse Treatment Intervention: A Behavioral Economic Analysis, (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), 3.

    66 Office for National Statistics, The nature of violent crime in England and Wales: Trends in Violent Crime

    How Safe are Our Children, Kidscape (1993), 1.

    67 Nicola Crosby, Crime Report 1998 to 2002, Tyne and Wear Archives, 1, 10.

    68 Nick Morgan, ‘The heroin epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s and its effect on crime trends – then and now: Technical Report,’ Home Office, 2014.

    69 Nick Morgan, ‘The heroin epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s and its effect on crime trends – then and now: Technical Report,’ Home Office, 2014.

    70 Franziska Till et al., ‘Social Identification in Times of Crisis: How Need to Belong, Perspective Taking, and Cognitive Closure Relate to Changes in Social Identification,’ Journal of Applied Social Psychology 55 (2024): 40.

    71 Mary Cooper, ‘Motorways and Transport Planning in Newcastle,’ SOC’EM Report (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: 1975), 18.

    72 Saran Michelle Mallinson, Dispersal: a barrier to integration? The UK dispersal policy for asylum seekers and refugees since 1999: the case of Iraqi Kurds (Thesis: University of Warwick, 2006), 266; Matthias Flug and Jason Hussein, ‘Integration in the Shadow of Austerity – Refugees in Newcastle upon Tyne,’ Social Sciences 8, no. 7 (2019): 212.

    73 Ibid, 195.

    74 Ibid, 195.

    75 Carol Stack, Call to home: African Americans Reclaim the Rural South (Basic Books: New York, 1996), 198.

    76 Although it must also be noted that the children of Old Byker were certainly no strangers to rooftops.

    77 Louis Holland Bonnett, photograph, Byker, March 2024.

    78 Louis Holland Bonnett, photograph, Byker, March 2024.

    79 Dradge, ‘Byker: Surprising the Colleagues for 35 Years,’ 156.

    80 Teresa Aslanian and Anne Turid, ‘Climbing, Hiding and Having Fun: Schoolchildren’s Memories of Holistic Learning in a Norwegian Kindergarten,’ Nordic Studies in Education 40 (2020): 268-285.

    81 Patricia Payne, ‘Bolam Coyne Northeast Aspect in 2008,’ photograph, Historic England Archive, Reference DP152710.

    82 Louis Holland Bonnett, photograph, Byker, December 2023.

    83 Mathew Thomson, Lost Freedom: The Landscape of the Child and the British Post-War Settlement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

    84 Krista Cowman, ‘The Gendering of Activism in the British Adventure Playgrounds Movement,’ Journal of Social History 53 (2019): 236.

    85 Sweet, Boy builders and Pink Princesses, 36.

    86 Strangleman, T. (2016). ‘Deindustrialisation and the Historical Sociological Imagination: Making Sense of Work and Industrial Change’, Sociology, 51(2), 469.

    87 Ibid.

    88 Stephanie Schoeppe et al., ‘Socio-Demographic Factors and Neighbourhood Social Cohesion Influence Adults’ Willingness to Grant Children Greater Independent Mobility: A Cross-Sectional Study,’ BMC Public Health 15, no. 1 (2015), 2.

  • Chapter 2: The Fearful Outdoors: Moral Panics, Media Discourse and Normative Childhood Geographies – The Natural Habitat of Youth?

    <- Chapter 1Chapter 3 ->

    1. 2.1 Introduction
    2. 2.2 Cars: The Missing Moral Panic
    3. 2.3 Out of the Shadows: The Press ‘Discovers’ Child Abuse
    4. 2.4 The Orkney Satanic Abuse Scandal
    5. 2.5 Stranger Danger and Boundary Making
    6. 2.6 Video Nasties
    7. 2.7 Conclusion
    8. References

    2.1 Introduction

    The relaunch of the previously ailing Sun newspaper in 1969 as Britain’s first modern-style tabloid marked the beginning of a fundamental shift in the country’s media landscape.1 The format proved popular and by 1978 The Sun had turned around its fortunes to become the country’s best-selling paper, inspiring many others to (re)launch in the same fashion such as The Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, and News of the World. These ‘new’ papers differentiated themselves from traditional strait-laced broadsheets with exciting, polemical, and often inflammatory commentaries alongside a focus on deeper engagement with their readership and public feeling. They were also the product of a consolidating industry with a small number of media moguls – Rupert Murdoch in particular – amalgamating their ownership. By 1987 Murdoch papers like The Sun constituted 1/3rd of all newspaper sales in Britain, and his symbiotic relationship with the Thatcher governments was a defining factor in both the deregulation of the industry and the explosion in readership of tabloids during the 1980s.2 Conversely, local newspapers had for some years been experiencing a ‘provincial meltdown’ as readership plummeted, sending many out of business and stripping those that remained of the income necessary to engage in consistent high-quality reporting, further centralising and concentrating news media production.3

    Despite the growing popularity of the TV, and later the internet, historians have argued that the tabloids defined the media landscape during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and indeed forced new digital media to adapt to their ‘populist priorities’ of ‘speed, brevity, accessibility, drama and controversy’.4 The drama-led skew of the tabloid reporting style often led papers like The Sun to spotlight and repeatedly return to specific individual human stories – or ‘scandals’ – with which the public could emotionally connect, and such coverage would frequently turn to campaigning as the newspaper took up the cause of a certain afflicted individual or community. This approach was both one of the keys to the success of tabloid journalism and a key driver behind wider discourse also being defined by various ‘scandals’ during this period.

    Of special relevance to this thesis was the openness of the tabloid press toward collaboration with members of the public – either as individuals or assembled as campaign groups – to bring their issues into national discourse. Parents concerned for the safety of their children around strangers featured in the press often, and conversely so too did people fearing the dangers of a ‘new youth’ that was said to be more uncaring, disrespectful, and violent than ever before. Both narratives problematised the relationship between children and outdoor environments, as either the outdoors was characterised as unsafe for children, or children as unsafe for the outdoors. New technologies were also common subjects of concern, with the discourse around them blending fears about the corruptible nature of children with the dangers of what were seen as unknown, unpredictable digital environments in which – much like the outdoors – adults had less control over children than they would like. Indeed, technologies like the TV and internet played a complex role as both informers of – and subjects of – public discourse about their safety, as symbolised by the 22-year-long TV run of Why Don’t You?.5

    This chapter will mirror the tabloid format by focussing on three defining ‘scandal’ stories of the period relating to the dangers children faced by strangers and technology, and how the reporting of those events chose to represent different environments of childhood. The first scandal I discuss is the 1991 Orkney satanic child abuse case, in which city social workers removed nine children from a rural island on suspicion of child abuse, only to return them a month later amidst a massive media storm. In Orkney, I find that the reporting of the event infused the pastoral island landscape with a notion of a middle-class, rural purity in which children necessarily flourish set against an urban environment of cosmopolitan corruption – as embodied by the social workers. This narrative was indicative and promotional of a social belief that not only cast urban environments as improper for childhood but also rural environments as something urban people were not necessarily worthy of.

    The second scandal I examine is that of a longer panic the press played a key role in stoking during the 1990s and 2000s: ‘stranger-danger’. Coverage of stranger-danger problematised all public outdoor space on grounds of safety, as dramatic reports of (in actuality very rare) attacks on children by strangers scared families into restricting childhood freedom and mobility for fear of a danger that was ever-present because it was unknowable. This promoted the use of private enclosed spaces like gardens and sports centres over public streets and parks, disadvantaging households with worse access to such private environments. Very importantly, this also ignored and distracted from the far more pervasive and unseen danger of at-home abuse.

    The final scandal I examine is the ‘video nasty’ panic of the mid-1980s which is an early example of how technological environments accessed at home were also being positioned in the media as spaces that corrupted children. This meant that children who had the least access to ‘acceptable’ outdoor space (and thus spent more time indoors) were left with no physical place where they were not seen to be in danger either from others or themselves. Within this framework, it became increasingly common to think of children themselves, corrupted by modern technology and permissiveness, as the cause of their own decline in outdoor play and the decline of childhood itself, as an idea and experience.

    Overall, this chapter demonstrates the media’s significant role in contributing to the milieux of social anxiety amongst parents and policymakers during this period that led to both an increase in restriction of children’s mobility and an outcry over the laziness of the modern ‘couch potato generation’. Drawing on and adding to the well-established historical literature on media moral panics, particularly the work of Adrian Bingham, Jenny Kitzenger, David Jenkins, and Jennifer Crane, this chapter advances an environmental argument that connects media representations of certain ‘scandalised’ environments with their real-world consequences for children’s relationships with those places – as interpreted and mediated by adults. As with the first chapter, this style of study is justified on the basis Mora et al.’s analytical framework of the ‘circuit of culture’ – connecting public and media representations of childhood environments to how those spaces were produced, identified, and consumed.6

    This chapter is also concerned with how parents, carers, and institutions changed their approaches to managing children based on how their perceptions of different environments were shaped by public discourse. This extends not only to parents disallowing younger children from doing things like walking to school or playing outside unsupervised, but also to how adult society at large came to frown on older children for ‘hanging around’ in parks or shopping centres, or indeed for spending too much time indoors. This approach grounds my analysis of public discourse in the physical environments being discussed and, more specifically, how during this period they came to change children and be changed by them. When discussing the two North East case study areas in subsequent chapters, this national context is essential to understand when considering how it impacted upon, and was intermediated by, local communities.

    Importantly, this chapter will also address why there was no moral panic surrounding cars and urbanism as there was for strangers and technology despite (as outlined in Chapter One) the topic’s popularity in expert discourse. I do so by utilising Martin Innes’ concept of ‘signal crimes’, Rob Nixon’s concept of ‘slow violence’, and Stuart Hall’s concept of the ‘signification spiral’ to explain why Orkney, stranger-danger, and video nasties became such significant and influential media events whereas the destruction of childhood play environments and danger to children’s lives posed by cars was comparatively ignored. Stories such as the dangers of leaded petrol and the construction of new motorways through protected landscapes were reported on and did enter public discourse, but never with the intensity and purpose typical of a ‘moral panic’. Primarily this was because the danger was characterised by ‘slow violence’ – a steady, encroaching change – and not the kinds of explosive scandals or ‘signal crimes’ that fuelled tabloid campaigns, and thus there was no clear single idea that could be latched onto and used as part of a ‘signification spiral’ to draw people to conclude that one event was emblematic of a much larger issue that needed to be addressed. This analysis is key because by revealing how cars’ real threat to children failed to result in a significant panic or response, it demonstrates that what was regarded as dangerous to children was contingent on socially constructed discourse. Therefore, restrictions placed on childhood freedoms were not based simply on pragmatic response to danger, but on perceived danger that was neither inevitable or immutable and was the product of historically specific factors. I also utilise these analytical concepts to bolster the argument that media coverage explicitly and/or implicitly causally linked scandal events not only to the specific environment they took place in, but to a wider category of environment that was then viewed with public suspicion.

    2.2 Cars: The Missing Moral Panic

    The British media’s approach to the reporting of threats to childhood during this period was to focus on specific key events. Certain emotive stories that fit well with tabloid-style journalism were presented as symbolically representative of a wider problem that the British people should demand something be done about, typically by giving their support for new regulations and enforcement measures. Martin Innes calls these events ‘signal crimes’ – media-events which highlight the symbiotic relationships journalists have with the police and criminal justice system. For example, the police commonly used media publicity to appeal for witnesses in cases like the decade-long hunt for serial killer Robert Black during the 1980s; this was in the interests of both detectives and journalists who worked together to both solve a case and get a story.7 However, such collaboration worked to amplify the ‘signal value’ of a particular event and ‘either intentionally or unintentionally transform it into a focal point for public concerns about crime and crime control’, as well as lending the authority of the police to whichever moral panic the papers were presenting a particular event as symptomatic of.8 The problem with the threats posed to childhood from the new urban environment of the car was that there was no associated explosive ‘signal crime’ to attach the issue to; just a steady, encroaching change. This is very often the case with environmental threats that move predictably but slowly, compared to human threats that can be both fast and unpredictable, as with the sudden introduction of a new technology or appearance of a strange figure. The spread of the motor car was a form of what Rob Nixon calls ‘slow violence’; the sort of ‘catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle but high in long-term effects’.9 Partly because of this spectacle-deficiency, I argue, whilst the car was the primary force exacerbating the decline in environmental quality and choice available to children, it was ignored in favour of the more minor but more ‘newsworthy’ dangers of strangers and technology.

    A defining feature of the signal crime phenomenon is that it is intended to ‘bring something to light’ and therefore reconfigure people’s behaviours or beliefs in some way. Most importantly, the response to the signal may involve either an individual or collective decision to make changes to the environments perceived to be under threat – the environments of childhood in this case. During the studied period, these changes were sometimes physical crime-prevention measures like the installation of CCTV cameras, but more crucially they were also changes in communities’ social fabric that leant toward risk-avoidance and political demands for more policing, laws, and social control. Less explicit, but equally important, these changes involved a reframing of the mental maps that people used to locate potential dangers and threats in everyday life. Thus, the media’s role in amplifying signal crimes not only spread fear about the risks posed by the specific danger in a case (like an individual), but of a more general threat that they came to represent (like a type of individual). To put it simply, parents were being told that if one child wasn’t safe, no child was. As Cutter has shown through studying health risks, people tend to worry more about high-profile, dramatic, and visible risks than they do about the comparatively invisible hazards that they are routinely exposed to, such as that posed by air pollution.10 Furthermore as Slovic identifies, these worries find particularly fertile soil when centred around a topic that is poorly understood.11 Parents felt they understood the car and its risks – statistically they owned one – but they didn’t necessarily feel they understood the unknowns of new technologies and strangers. This is how car-oriented urban environments could be seen as dangerous, but cars themselves as safe. The car itself was a bubble, a moveable extension of private home space over which a parent had, in theory, total control.12

    The ubiquity and symbolism of the car were two further factors making it an unlikely target for the press. Rising rates of car ownership and expansion of facilitating infrastructure during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s did threaten children – but it was the population at large that drove cars, not a specific minority. In the early 20th century, the ‘extreme danger of motor cars’ came under constant criticism in newspapers due to their high death toll for children in particular, but by 1980 the climate had changed.13 If the papers had attempted to create moral panic around the issue of cars, they would have needed to pick out the motorist as a target, which would have meant picking out their own readers as targets. Aside from being unpopular with readership, this would not have aligned with the politics of most of the tabloid press which during this period was supportive of the individualist freedoms that the car had come to represent. This was why even during the height of public protests against the construction of hundreds of new road schemes following Thatcher’s Roads for Prosperity programme during the 1980s and 1990s (most famously Twyford Down in 1992) – widely supported around the country and described by the Economist as a ‘a truly populist movement drawing from all walks of life’ – tabloid press did not get involved or call for legal change to the extent that they did after the Orkney scandal, for example.14

    2.3 Out of the Shadows: The Press ‘Discovers’ Child Abuse

    The British media and the tabloid press often perpetuated inaccurate and harmful representations of who and what did (and did not) pose a threat to children during this period. However, it must also be acknowledged that during the 1980s the media played a key role in publicising endemic problems of child abuse, and child sexual abuse in particular, that had been ignored in prior decades. In America in 1983 Time declared that ‘private violence’ was finally being ‘yanked out of the shadows’.15 In the UK, public recognition was emblematised by the launch of the TV show Childwatch in 1986. Childwatch included statistics and in-depth discussion about abuse and how to support victims, and its popularity with viewers led to the setup of the charity Childline. Childline itself received 50,000 calls on its opening day and calls continued at a rate of 8-10,000 per day after that, a fact which generated further media attention.16 The Childwatch programme was accompanied by a remarkable expansion in attention to child abuse, particularly sexual abuse, from other TV formats as well as the print media. Reporting of sexual abuse in The Times, for example, increased by 300% between 1985 and 1987.17

    Sexual abuse within families also became an issue for flagship UK documentary series such as Brass Tacks (BBC2, 1987), Everyman (BBC1, 1988), Antenna (BBC2, 1989) and Horizon (BBC2, 1989).18 TV films also increasingly played an important role. The American made-for-TV drama Something about Amelia broadcast in the UK in 1989 and was ‘often credited with doing for child sexual abuse what Cathy Come Home did for homelessness’ – getting the public emotionally invested in the subject matter.19 By the early 1990s child sexual abuse also began to appear in drama series. It featured in The Bill and Casualty as well as in a two-year running storyline in Channel 4’s soap-opera Brookside from 1993-1995. The storyline of the victim, Beth, was so important to some viewers that when the news leaked that the producers planned for her to commit suicide, various incest survivors’ groups demonstrated outside the TV studios under banners reading ‘Save Our Survivor’. Under this pressure the producers agreed to rewrite the plot so that Beth would die of natural causes.20

    The decade between 1985 and 1995 was thus a time of dramatic shifts in the public profile of child abuse. Indeed, this was so much the case that journalists who said they had been discouraged from following up stories of child abuse in the 1970s and early 1980s reported to the Economic Social Research Council (ESRC) that they now were suffering from ‘abuse fatigue’ from an over-reporting of these stories.21 It must be acknowledged, however, that the groundwork for recognising this abuse came initially from the grassroots work of early feminist activists and organisations, such as Florence Rush at the 1971 New York Radical Feminist Conference, who had called child sexual abuse ‘The Last Frontier’, challenging the pervasive Freudian view which held children responsible for their own abuse as ‘seducers’ of adults.22 In the UK the topic was a focus of the 1982 National Women’s Liberation Conference and the London Rape Crisis Centre made headlines when it reported in 1986 that a quarter of its clients were under 16.23 Furthermore, media interest in cases of child-abuse during this period focussed on particular forms of abuse at the expense on others, leading to a situation where many cases of at-home abuse from known persons were still being ignored.24

    The issue had broken into the mainstream towards the end of the 1980s, but how did the media portray the perpetrators of these crimes? At the crudest level sex offenders were often personified as sub-human animals. Many headlines dropped the straightforward term ‘man’ in favour of ‘fiend’, ‘pervert’, ‘monster’ or ‘animal’.25 Such reporting was often accompanied by disturbing mug shots of these ‘beasts’ with captions or headlines drawing attention to their distinctive appearance, such as The Sun’s ‘Evil Mr Staring Eyes’.26 On the other hand, if a photograph made an abuser look normal then a Jekyll and Hyde type-metaphor might be used such as The Star’s ‘Smile that hid the violent depravity of sex fiend headmaster’.27 This approach dehumanised the men who committed these crimes as individualised embodiments of evil, and thus avoided some of the trickier questions these incidents brought up around wider societal issues over the relationship between sexuality, masculinity, and power.28 Another related tactic was to associate attacks on children with homosexuality. One study that analysed all national British press reporting during 1991 found that abusers were explicitly identified as ‘homosexual’ in 50 newspaper articles such as The Independent’s ‘Man tells of homosexual abuse by care staff’, yet no article in any newspaper identified an abuser as heterosexual.29 Unlike the use of terms such as ‘monster’ and ‘beast’ which were mostly confined to the tabloids, identifying abuse as gay was common across all the press. A case in point was the coverage of the Frank Beck case, a man who assaulted boys over many years in the care home in which he worked. On that case The Guardian reported dismay at the fact that a care worker was allowed to foster two boys ‘even though there were complaints that he was homosexual’.30 In a clear demonstration of the interchangeability of the terms ‘homosexual’ and ‘paedophile’ in the British press, a Sunday Times report on a ‘murderous sex ring’ stated that the police had interviewed 92 men and ‘Not all of them were paedophiles; sometimes they were straight men’.31 Children were being ‘swallowed up in large cities’, the article went on to say, linking the urban environment to concepts of danger and depravity.32 This type of disparagement of the cityscape was common in the media during this period, despite the fact that most academic reports found that rural areas had equal to or higher rates of child maltreatment than urban areas, and indeed urban areas were at the ‘forefront’ of activities to prevent child abuse.33

    The environments of the school and the care home are interesting to examine, as they straddled the line between public and private space. By strict definition they were private premises, but they were not the nuclear family home, and their boundaries were more permissive. Stories about abuse in those environments carried with them the horror factor of the perpetrator being a trusted, known adult, but as they were also public institutions they could be simultaneously thought of as public environments wherein abuse was more ‘expected’ than at home. Furthermore, dangers or even just suggestions of dangers around these institutions were necessarily widely publicised though school letters, local papers, and school-gate gossip because of their public profile, and thus more likely to make it into a national paper. In reporting of child abuse in these settings, press coverage again individualised the problem down to the specific perpetrators, with little to no focus on the patterns of abuse in these settings, such as the preponderance of abuse cases coming out of private schools during the 1990s. Private schools had such an acute problem that Childline set up a specific helpline for them in 1991, yet reporting of abuse always framed the problem as certain men taking advantage of the institution in which they worked rather than also interrogating how the structures of that institution allowed abuse to occur for so long.34 In the prosecution of the headmaster with the ‘smile that hid violent depravity’, for example, the judge in the case made a point of saying that the man was a good teacher and the school ‘had admirable facilities and was well run’, despite what had been taking place there.35

    The media thus helped to bring to light issues of child abuse both at home as well as from strangers, but the question of who was to blame for these issues was more complex than that. Individualising the problem to ‘a few bad apples’ allowed abuse at large to continue. Contrarily, the press did often identify experts – those who had ‘allowed’ these things to occur – as needing institutional reform. Social workers attracted the most concentrated ire despite other professionals like police, doctors, and nurses usually being involved in the same cases. Indeed, these more respected professionals were likely to be portrayed as heroes rather than villains. The Department for Education’s (DfE) Munro Review of Child Protection, carried out in the wake the murder of the 1-year-old Peter Connelly (‘Baby P’) by his parents in 2007, found that 70% of news articles about the event were negative about social services.36 The report analysed all the coverage in The Sun, Mail, Mirror, Telegraph, Times and Guardian, and found that the equivalent figures for medical staff were just 54% negative, and for the police only 30%, when all had had involvement with the family before the death.37 Even more telling was the fact that the proportion of negative coverage given to social services (70%) was equivalent to that given to the parents themselves – the perpetrators of the crime.38 The message – intentional or otherwise – was that social workers were just as much to blame for the infant’s death as the parents.

    Why then was it that social workers attracted such exceptionally negative attention from the press? First, the nature of social work inevitably tended to attract media attention only when something had gone badly wrong; their day-to-day work understandably attracted little media interest, but whenever catastrophe struck it could not help but be dramatic and newsworthy, especially if children were involved. Second, as Leedham and Georgeson have studied, female-dominated professions like social workers were held to higher moral standards than others (and therefore more scathing critique), rooted in a misogynistic expectance for women to be morally pure.39 Third, the stereotype of ‘The Social Worker’ had earned a reputation in the tabloid press as being synonymous with ‘politically correct’ professionals employed by what came to be known as ‘loony left’ Labour councils – especially during the 1987 general election.40 In 1984, shortly after the media had generated this concept, the murders of two girls, Tyra Henry and Jasmine Beckford, occurred in London boroughs that were already in the media’s cross-hairs as ‘loony left’, and journalists weren’t slow to draw connections between the left-wing policies of these urban boroughs and the perceived failings of their social services departments. These inner-city places like Islington, Ealing, and Liverpool with a leadership focus on issues of gender, race, and sexuality that the press regarded as fringe issues. The Daily Mail’s ‘Poison at Red Ted’s Town Hall’ (18 July, 1985) focussed on Tyra and divisions in Lambeth council caused by ‘criticism and interference by black councillors especially’.41 Ted Knight, the leader of Lambeth council, was made (not entirely unwillingly) into a figurehead for the ‘loony left’ due to Lambeth’s famous use of lesbian and gay committees, nuclear-free zones, and flying of red flags.42 Another article from The Daily Mail on Brent council and Jasmine’s case read:

    But what of those who could have saved her; who had the legal power, the professional responsibility and, in theory, the trained expertise to save her? What of the social workers of the London Borough of Brent?43

    Because ‘loony left’ councils and associated social service departments were always city-based, urbanity came to be the associated environment of moral suspicion in most of the tabloid press. As a counterpoint the rural environment was commonly represented as a place of safety and common sense, where the more conservative populations knew better than to fall prey to ‘loony left’ ideology. This can be seen most evidently and most explosively in one of the defining child abuse ‘signal’ cases of the 1990s: the February 1991 Orkney satanic abuse scandal.

    2.4 The Orkney Satanic Abuse Scandal

    Early in the morning of the 27 February 1991, and without warning, social workers came to the Orkney island of South Ronaldsay and forcibly removed nine children from their homes and parents on suspicion of widespread ritual child abuse. The allegations, however, would turn out to be false and the children were returned home two months later. The story became a huge media eventduring this period withover quarter of all UK press stories about child abuse during 1991 given over to it – more than 400 features.44 This is a prime case study of a moral panic linked to media representations of childhood environments. As will be shown, the way the remote rural island of South Ronaldsay was represented in the press against the city environments the children were taken to, such as Inverness and Glasgow, is telling of how urban places and children were increasingly portrayed as incompatible during this time.

    From an early stage after the ‘dawn raids’ – as they came to be known – coverage by the press and TV was sympathetic to the islanders, particularly after the formation of the South Ronaldsay Parents Action Committee (SRPAC). SRPAC decided to work closely with the media to put their case forward, sharing the highly emotive stories of the moments their children were taken away, such as one mother describing how ‘I actually came running into the house screaming for my own mother who’s been dead for 20 years’.45 This parent-paper partnership was recognised by another mother interviewed on the return of her child, saying ‘just thanks, everybody. Thanks press, thank you community, wonderful to have the children home’.46 This contrasted starkly with the social workers who communicated very little with the media, partly due to reticence, but also to legal restrictions surrounding client confidentiality.47 Indeed, during the two months before the official dismissal of the social workers’ case in April, most reporting was at the very least sceptical of the charges of satanic abuse, and it is my contention that the evidence suggests that South Ronaldsay’s landscape acted as both proof of, and a metaphor for, its inhabitants’ innocence in press coverage. Such stories had always been popular in the printed press, but the unusual popularity of this story with TV news media is evidence of the essentiality of South Ronaldsay’s image to the story. For months, news reports would open with evocative shots of the isolated harbour or scenic countryside, to the extent that in a study asking people their memories of the event, one participant described how she ‘got into the habit of going off to make herself a cup of tea whenever she saw the typical “establishing shot” on TV’.48

    Figure I. South Ronaldsay’s Harbour, as shown on BBC news.49

    In almost all reporting the island was depicted in utopian terms, the perfect place to raise a child. The language used upheld the romanticist association between childhood innocence and natural virtue. Newsnight describedSouth Ronaldsay as a ‘haven of peace’ and the locals as ‘good working people’.50 Most had not grown up in Orkney but had moved there in pursuit of ‘the simple life’, according to Channel 4 News, or to ‘escape the rat race of contemporary urban society’ as Scotland on Sunday put it.51 Indeed the island’s very remoteness and physical distance from the metropolitan sphere, which in prior decades would likely have been used to cast it as uncivilised, was instead a mark of its purity from urban corruption, allowing its inhabitants ‘a quieter, more fulfilling existence’.52 Amongst many others, the Sunday Tribune made the point the people were ‘uniformly English, articulate, and middle class’ and had chosen Orkney specifically because ‘It was regarded as a “place of safety” to bring up their children’ – this phrase used with deliberate irony as a ‘place of safety’ order was the name of the ruling used to take the children off the island.53 Making pains to connect South Ronaldsay’s ruralness and its middle-classness pre-empted any reader preconceptions surrounding rural backwardness, but it was also revealing of a prevailing presumption which connected middle and upper-class children to nature and purity in a way that working-class children were not.

    As well as conducting many interviews with individual islanders, the media also worked to broadcast group SRPAC petitions and demonstrations, in which ‘the island’ and its people became synonymous. Very little reporting acknowledged any differences in opinion on South Ronaldsay, creating the impression of a homogenous group of people. The Mail on Sunday wrote of ‘Fears of an outraged island’, The Daily Mail of ‘Village fury’, and Scotland on Sunday went for ‘Orkney Reels’ as a headline.54 In these articles, terms like ‘parents’, ‘islanders’, ‘village’, and ‘the island’ were used with little distinction between them to refer to the people of South Ronaldsay, evidencing and propagating the idea that people and place were one and the same. This is a common way to talk about communities generally, but within this construction, no islander could not fit the vaguely held perception that South Ronaldsay’s landscape had the ability to purify its inhabitants. The 1983 film ‘Local Hero’, which follows an uncaring American oil executive redeemed by a ‘dreamlike’ Scottish coastal village, is an example of this idea expressed in the popular culture of the period.55 Unlike South Ronaldsay’s residents however, the social workers were incomers who had not stayed long enough to breathe the cleansing air. Some descriptions of the ‘dawn raids’ implied the social workers had introduced a kind of evil to this contemporary Eden. The Daily Record showed a picture of parents looking over the Orkney landscape with the caption ‘Paradise Lost’.56 The Daily Telegraph also used the term ‘paradise lost’, and described the morning of the raid in gothic fashion:

    It is a story that can only be thought of in monochrome. There are houses of grey granite and a swirling Orcadian mist.57

    Weather was a key component of how the island’s environment came to be integral to the story, partly due to its metaphorical value. Shortly after the event The Times described ‘islands under a cloud’, again demonstrating the monolithic depiction of the Orcadians, but also the pseudo-biblical manner in which weather was often used to synthesise this satanic story.

    Figure II. Captioned Photo of St. Margaret’s Hope in The Times, 4 March 1991.58

    On the children’s April return to the island The Daily Mirror picked up a similar theme with ‘Storm as sex abuse kids fly home’.59 ITV news, on the other hand, reported that ‘After days of rain, the island was bathed in sunshine today, a fitting welcome back for the children’.60 Despite two opposing weather-metaphors being used, in both cases South Ronaldsay’s environment was utilised to vindicate the inhabitants – as if the landscape itself knew of how it had been wronged by the social workers. The Express described the ‘brilliant sunshine etching the hills and fields in spring gold’ and explicitly linked this to the island’s status as a secure playground for youngsters: ‘It looked like the perfect safe haven for children to play…’.61 The Scotsman used ‘Sunshine after the storm’ , and Scotland on Sunday went with ‘From magic summer to winter nightmare’.62 In the same article a photo of the quarry where the abuse was alleged to have taken place was captioned poetically as ‘In that long, now lost summer, the place where the water warmed up and brought youngsters from miles around’.63 The island environment did not have to be employed this way, as one anomalous Evening News article from before the children’s return proved. In it, the paper represented the island as a cold, shadowy, and divided place. South Ronaldsay was ‘a place so wild it appears to have been abandoned totally by both God and man’ and described the same quarry from the Scotland on Sunday article as ‘remote… shrouded in mist [and] partially filled with muddy water’.64

    Figure III. The quarry, as shown on BBC news.65

    Similarly, The Evening News’ negative portrayal of the rural focussed on the concept of ‘wilderness’, a dangerous environment in which children hurt themselves and are roughened by. Conversely, the numerous positive portrayals depicted a tamer, more genteel landscape that better fit the image of a middle-class idyll. For much of the press, it was the cities the children were taken away to that took on the role of ‘wilderness’. The corrupting ‘urban jungle’.An interview with one of the returned children was highlighted in the Daily Record and many other newspapers wherein a boy ‘spoke of learning to steal cars, roll a cannabis joint and glue sniffing’ after being taken off the island – a clear demonstration of a loss of childhood innocence and corruption by the urban sphere.66

    Figure IV. Front page of the Daily Record, 6 April 1991.67

    The Daily Mirror ran the headline ‘They left here unharmed, they’re coming home abused’.68 One mother described how her daughter had been bullied and withdrawn when they lived on the mainland but had ‘made very good progress’ since moving to Orkney – which she feared would now be ‘set back badly’ after the ordeal.69 The whole saga was understandably traumatic for the families, and it was used by tabloid and TV news to promote a general narrative about the benefits of country over city life for children. In reading the Daily Record article more closely, it is made clear that the car-stealing, cannabis-smoking, glue-sniffing boy only ever talked about these things with other kids, though the headlines implied he witnessed and took part in them.70 However, while the prevailing impression given was that something so abhorrent as child abuse simply could not happen in idyllic Orkney, almost no papers mentioned that five years earlier a father on South Ronaldsay had been imprisoned for abusing eight children, and that none of the locals had suspected anything at the time.71 Furthermore, it was accusations made by the abused children during that legitimate case that led to the 1991 dawn raid.

    The Independent did mention this in one article and quoted a local as saying ‘We’d never have thought. He must have been a Jekyll and Hyde character. Nobody could believe it when he was taken away’.72 This, The Independent noted, brought under suspicion the claims from locals and the press that they would somehow instinctively know if something like that was going on. It was symptomatic of the common assumption that an abuser had a particular ‘look’ or ‘manner’, and furthermore – I argue – lived in a particular environment. Additionally, what was not reported on was the fact the dismissal of the social workers’ case was overturned not because it had no substance but because it was deemed ‘impossible’ for the sheriff ‘to bring a fair and balanced judgement to the issues’.73 Because the case was then dropped due to being deemed ‘compromised’, the social workers’ evidence was never heard in a court of law or officially dismissed. There was no ritual abuse on South Ronaldsay, but the conviction that there never could be, and the general assumption that the social workers had no evidence because the case was dismissed, was false and partially based on a form of environmental prejudice that favoured an image of South Ronaldsay’s middle-class rustic charm.

    The importance of media representations of the environment during a key a signal-crime ‘scandal’ such as Orkney was made apparent during a study over a decade later into the public’s memories of the event. The powerful image of the rural idyll against the urban mire constructed in the media made a lasting impression on the public, more so than any specific details of the scandal, as most people could (unsurprisingly) only remember headlines, broad strokes, and impressions. What they remembered most were particularly powerful or oft-repeated talking points and imagery: the close-knit united community nestled into a beautiful rural landscape suddenly sundered by the ‘dawn raids’, evocatively described by both reporters and in the emotive pleas of parents.74 One of the consequences of newspapers and parents working so closely together on this story was the lasting impact that personal accounts had on the public compared to third-party reporting. For example, very few of the research participants remembered that social services won an appeal against the decision to return the children home, and could have taken them away again if they wanted, but decided not to partly because of the media backlash such a move would have generated. Very few ascribed any blame to the police for the incident, who helped orchestrate and were present at the dawn raids but came under far less media scrutiny. Furthermore, because the parents were absolved in such a high-profile story, the Orkney scandal helped to reinforce the idea of the ‘stranger’ – especially the urban stranger – as the real danger to children. After all, had not the big-city social-workers been the real menace? The pervasive idea that the Orkney islands were ‘not that kind of place’, both at the time and decades after, was propagated by press representation, despite the fact that urban areas were at the ‘forefront’ of child abuse prevention during the period.75 Ultimately, the message scandals such as Orkney sent to families was that the best environments to raise a child were rural, remote, and ‘respectable’.

    2.5 Stranger Danger and Boundary Making

    Despite public opinion being led to believe otherwise, there were no significant changes in the prevalence of attacks on children from strangers during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.76 As before, during this period less than 1% of all missing children per year were the victims of the ‘stereotypical kidnapping’, as in abduction by a stranger.77 As David Pimentel illustratively put it, ‘It would take your child, left outside, 500,000 years to be abducted by a stranger, and 1.4 million years for a stranger to murder them’.78 By contrast, in 1995 the ESRC found that 96% of newspaper articles about how to protect children focussed on threats from strangers.79 Following a spate of attacks by strangers, The Sun’s ‘WEEP, 3 children murdered in 100 hrs as Britain sinks to a new low’ (14 August 1991) ignored the fact that a child was being killed by their parents every two or three days in Britain, and this statistic had been unchanged for many years.80 Similarly, a 2002 study for the Journal of Interpersonal Violence found that TV news reports covering child sexual abuse perpetrated by persons known to the child led only 31% of viewers to assign ‘moral responsibility’ to the abuser because they perpetuated stereotypes about the victim ‘leading them on’.81 Home abuse, despite being significantly more prevalent than abuse from strangers, was disregarded because it was not proportionally represented in the news and victims were more likely to be considered morally suspect. Indeed, the message of ‘stranger danger’ relied on the idea of the safe home environment to act as its foil. If stranger meant danger, then familiar meant safety. In this fashion, all public space (particularly urban space) was characterised as dangerous and as such the importance of having boundaries between public (outdoor) and private (indoor) space became a critical issue.

    A representative for the Kidscape charity said in an interview in 1995 that stories of home abuse were rarely printed because ‘it’s not a fun subject, it’s likely to put readers off… and it’s easier and safer to concentrate on strangers and bullying’.82 The message that an abuser ‘could be anyone’ had reached people to some extent but, as interviews undertaken on this subject in the mid-1990s highlighted, most people – while salient of this fact – were not prepared to believe allegations made against anyone they knew. This assumption was ‘often accompanied by a sense that, if they did meet an abuser, they would instinctively know’, showing how the idea that an abuser would be identifiably different from a ‘normal person’ was pervasive.83 As an extension of this, people also found it hard to believe that an abuser would be living in their community, even if that community was the sort of working-class urban estate usually characterised as the places most at risk of such attacks.84 This exemplifies the fact that ‘the stranger’ existed predominantly as a conceptual category. The danger was real enough for people to limit their children’s mobility and freedoms in response to it, but the threat was always thought about as something unknowable and outside the bounds of familial control. The vagueness of the concept affected children too. A survey carried out by Kidscape in 1984 found that 90% of children could not identify or define who might be a ‘stranger’, despite knowing that they were dangerous.85

    Media representations of stranger-danger were reinforced and reiterated through everyday conversation, particularly because events involving strangers, such as a strange man hanging around outside a school, were collective experiences in public spaces, whereas events involving known persons were hidden from view inside. It was also common for police officers to go into schools to show videos about stranger danger and give out warning slogans such as ‘keep away from people you don’t know’ and ‘you don’t want to end up dead or in hospital, say ‘No’ to strangers!’, encouraging children and parents to talk over the idea.86 When particularly shocking cases of abuse from friends or relatives did make headlines, the perpetrators, dehumanised into ‘monsters’, were represented as if they had been Jekyll and Hyde split-personality types, as if to some extent they had secretly been an ‘outsider’ all along. In this fashion, high-profile cases of abuse perpetrated by known persons were wrapped up into the media’s broader obsession with ‘the stranger’. More to the point, at-home abuse was simply less likely to be reported in the media – or at all – because the issue was not discussed with children or adults, making an already very difficult topic to discuss ever harder for kids who may be manipulated, confused, or ashamed by what was happening at home.

    Depending on the size and strength of a community’s social cohesion, the inside/outside dynamic could also play out at a neighbourhood level as opposed to just a household level. As seen with Orkney, close-knit communities found it hard to believe that one of their own (an insider) could be an abuser.87 Accepting such a fact meant admitting that an environment they previously conceived of as safe could, in fact, be corrupted from the inside as well as outside forces. However, the key difference between (most) neighbourhoods and homes is that a neighbourhood’s boundaries are social whereas the walls of the home are physical, meaning outside dangers can more easily cross the community threshold. It is unsurprising then that the visual language used to describe strangers very often positioned them as being on the other side of a boundary like a fence or window, just outside, and therefore placed extreme importance on such boundaries. As Markus noted, the very purpose of a building or built environment is to serve certain people and exclude others. In this way, ‘social structures are made tangible in the spaces and buildings that groups use’.88

    For example, the establishing shot of the PIF Say no to Strangers (1985), shown in schools and on TV, framed its stranger through the links of a school fence.89 The effect of this representation was to promote an insider/outsider mentality and by extension place a great deal of importance on the fence itself as a barrier to threats beyond it, as well as encouraging parents to ‘always know where they are any time of the day’ as a contemporary PIF put it.90 Higher walls, fences, and hedges around private gardens was indeed an increasing trend during this period and new housing developments were also built to more insular design standards, with smaller windows in the front, windowless garages, and smaller front porch areas – in contrast to the growing popularity of fully windowed architecture in commercial and professional environments.91 This was also evidence of the increasing premium being placed on private spaces as the ‘proper’ place for children to be raised, which meant that those families with the least private space were seen as negligent for letting their kids roam the public realm.92 Ironically, the increase in the quantity, height, and opacity of barriers ultimately reduced the amount of ‘eyes on the street’ able to keep a passive watch on kids at play, as had been common on working-class streets in the first half of the 20th century, reducing child safety.93

    Say no to Strangers also depicted its stranger in a car, a trope in media representation that was fairly accurate as cars were a common tool for kidnappers who wanted to get in and out of an area quickly. To a certain extent this was another symptom of the dangers cars and car infrastructure posed to children who increasingly needed to wait for a lift to get anywhere. Furthermore, it demonstrated how the completely enclosed environment of the car represented a unique danger as it allowed anybody to bring a small piece of dangerous ‘outside’ space into the inside of a community and tempt a child across that threshold. As was shown in many theatrical films and PIFs of the period, once inside a moving car with the doors locked, it was not feasible for the child to leave. In this way, the car’s boundaries could be made permeable or solid at the will of the stranger, and that is why it was promoted in the Never go with Strangers PIF that ‘it is best to think about a strange car as danger’.94

    Figure V. A stranger beyond the school fence, as shown on the ‘Say no to Strangers’ PIF.95

    In the second half of the 1990s a slightly modified version of the traditional threat rose to media prominence and created a more specific and intense moral panic: the paedophile. In essence the threat of the paedophile was no different from the more general ‘stranger’ threat before it, but it chimed with the particular focus placed on child sexual abuse during this period in both expert and public discourse. A number of serial child sex murderers made famous in the 1960s and 1970s were due to be released from prison in the 1990s. Myra Hindley, in particular, who the press had made into ‘the face’ of these crimes, was in and out of the papers during the 1990s and 2000s due to a long twisting string of events including parole hearings and appeals. This reached one moment of culmination in 1990 when, close to her release date, the home secretary David Waddington increased Hindley’s sentence amidst a flurry of fearful tabloid reporting.96 Also in 1990, Robert Black, the serial rapist and murderer and Britain’s most wanted man, was finally caught and put on trial after a decade on the run; the extensive reporting further raising the profile of this type of threat.97 The murder of James Bulger in 1993 also shook the nation, particularly because his abduction was caught on security camera, allowing parents to visualise the threat. The Newcastle Journal reported that it was this event which had prompted one man from Whitley Bay ‘to invent the revolutionary new child safety strap’ (a lead for your child).98

    With danger repeatedly in the news, parents were understandably increasingly fearful of public outdoor spaces because they were portrayed as fundamentally unsafe, especially for their daughters. Indeed, a 1993 survey found that ‘British parents fear the abduction of their children over any other danger’.99 Of course, this understanding failed to recognise the higher likelihood of attack from known persons, which also most threatened girls. From the 1970s onwards UK street crime had in fact been falling as a proportion of the population whilst a 1985 NSPCC report found that abuse of children at home had increased by 70% between 1979 and 1984.100

    Figure VI. The Evening Chronicle reporting day-by-day kidnap attempts, not clarifying if these were from strangers or from estranged parents, as was most common.101

    Nevertheless in 1996, in an attempt to assuage public fear over paedophiles, the home secretary Michael Howard introduced legislation to create a register of sex offenders and monitor them after release, generating headlines like The Times’ ‘Paedophile lists for police’, highlighting how child sex offenders were seen to be the primary target of the law, even though the list was for all sex offenders.102 However, the creation of the register prompted many questions about how the list would be managed and who would have access to it. Community organisations usually based on council estates such as ‘Freedom for Children’, ‘People’s Power’, ‘Parents Opposed to Paedophiles’, and ‘The Unofficial Child Protection Unit’ began to demand public access to the register and that they be notified when dangerous individuals moved into their neighbourhood.103 In the US, legislation known as Megan’s Law introduced in 1996 did just that.104 In this way the creation of the register increased awareness and fears over the paedophile threat, as parents knew that there was a list which could confirm or deny if a former sex-offender lived in their area but that they could not access it.

    The strong correlation between anti-paedophile campaigns and council estates is evidence of the fact that the paedophile threat was understood to be an issue particular to a certain type of community. For practical reasons councils tended to place released prisoners in hostels and housing in working-class areas, often on council estates, where it was cheapest. Furthermore, the growing body of negative press about social workers – a more common sight in working-class neighbourhoods – fuelled distrust in authorities to monitor or investigate properly should a crime occur. Especially within these communities therefore, agitation grew into letter-writing campaigns and petitions set up by newspapers, and then further into demonstrations, civil disobedience, and even attacks on suspected paedophiles. In several instances the police even had to be brought in to protect released sex offenders from the public, and in some cases as with Francis Duffy in 1997, a person was wrongfully attacked after being mistaken for a paedophile identified in the paper.105 Already more likely to lack access to safe outdoor spaces for play and natural environments, working-class families were now also especially exposed to the perceived dangers of paedophiles in their communities. The very name of a group like ‘Freedom for Children’ alluded to the much broader mission the group saw itself as undertaking to restore lost childhood environments in which their children could safely play. Similarly, ‘The Unofficial Child Protection Unit’ name underlined the lack of faith in ‘official’ child protection organisations.

    The phenomenon of parent-activism had already been seeing a noticeable uptick since the 1960s – following in the post-war tradition of the self-help group – but in the 1970s the nature of these groups began to change into something more political and campaign-oriented. Crane argues that groups post-1945 were often focussed on mutual support and aid of their members, whilst also making ‘representations to Parliament looking to add complexity to visions of “normal family life”’. In the following decades under Conservative governments however, these groups challenged ‘individualist models of responsibility for child protection’ and campaigned directly for more state resources for childcare. As outlined in the previous chapter, Thatcher’s distrust of the public sector resulted in an explosion of new smaller organisations that operated with great freedom in between the bureaucratic cracks, such as Kidscape, Childline, and Children in Need. These new groups were assisted by the media which offered a public forum to discuss children’s experiences and emotions, albeit around a news-cycle built on cases of terrible child abuse. By the time of the paedophile moral panic in the 1990s and 2000s, a number of groups had embraced an ethos of vigilantism, bolstered by media praise and enabled by reporting of suspected paedophiles’ descriptions and addresses. On the other side of things, Parents Against Injustice (PAIN) was a group set up to make it harder for accusations of child abuse directed at parents and other known-persons to result in legal action. This was because, they said, an ‘anxious climate’ had emerged where false accusations were common.106

    Co-operation between the press and community organisations was thus key to the rise of the paedophile threat in the late 1990s and 2000s. Newspapers almost always sided with parents when protests or even violent attacks occurred; headlines in the national press included: ‘Parents in dark as paedophiles stalk schools’, ‘Paedophile out of prison “fearful for life and limb”’, ‘Mothers drive sex criminal off estate’, ‘Stop hiding perverts say protest mums’, and ‘Town not told of paedophile’s stay’.107 Such reports were also often accompanied by photographs of local people marching with banners declaring ‘Perverts out’ or children carrying placards reading ‘Make Me Safe’.108 In this way both the imagery of the child and children themselves were being used to advocate for the cultural and legal changes during this period that resulted in their lives becoming increasingly restricted. A self-perpetuating cycle was created between public protests against paedophiles living in their area and tabloid press fuelling and being fuelled by them, which together gave the impression that working-class estates were the only places at risk.

    In 1997 the Manchester Evening News published a front-page spread about a local sex offender alongside a photograph of him in his car behind a smashed windscreen after ‘a vigilante mob had vented their anger’.109 Many newspapers took this more proactive role as guardians of public safety over merely reporting local unrest. When Robert Oliver, who had murdered a boy in 1985, was released from prison in 1997 he was pursued by journalists. The Sun asked its readers to phone an emergency number if they spotted him and, when he moved to Brighton the local paper, the Evening Argus, published his picture on their front page with the headline ‘Beware this evil Pervert’.110 In other cases, journalists alerted people to the presence of paedophiles, either through knocking on the doors of neighbours and asking how they felt about living near a sex offender or through outing them on the front page. The Sunday Express printed photographs and details of offenders with their last known address under the headline ‘Could these evil men be living next door to you?’ and the Daily Record produced a similar campaign, devoting the bulk of one issue to asserting a ‘Charter for our Children’ and demanding the ‘legal right for communities to be told when a pervert moves into the area’.111 By promoting suspicion, these reports sundered the social boundaries of community, leaving only physical boundaries as the ‘last line of defence’ against sexual predators. This of course ignored the more prevalent danger of abuse from known persons. Particularly revealing is the 1985 Guardian article ‘The Video Nasty that Children Ought to See’ which reviews an education film titled Kids Can Say No!.112 The film was presented by Rolf Harris, who, it was later uncovered, was actively sexually abusing children at the time of the recording of this film. In the film Harris advises that ‘some people don’t act right with kids and they need help… It’s better to say something so that you and the family can get the help you need’. This statement presupposes that ‘the family’ will not be the source of danger. More to the point, Harris’ position as a popular known person helped to protect him from the consequences of his abuses for decades, the reality being that abuse from familiar persons was still a taboo subject being overshadowed by the inflated spectre of stranger-danger.113

    The British media’s reporting – and that of the tabloid press in particular – clearly contributed to an exaggerated atmosphere of fear and unrest across the country, however this did not mean the entire moral panic was vacuous. What it did mean was the more prevalent, systemic, personal dangers to children went underreported and as such unacknowledged by the public. Because of this, parents across the country were being given an inaccurate picture of where danger lay, and as such promoted an isolationist approach to the physical and social makeup of homes, schools, and communities via the use of high, opaque walls, fences, hedges, private indoor spaces, curfews, and other restrictions on children’s independent mobility. By privatising childhood environments in this way, whilst also placing ‘the outdoors’ on a pedestal, morally acceptable childhoods became restricted to those families who had large gardens and the time, money, and means to take their kids to sports activities and National Trust landmarks. In this environment, technologies like TVs, games consoles, and computers came to be integral to childhood experience across the three decades of this study.

    2.6 Video Nasties

    Due to their vulnerable position in society and reliance on adults, children can prove a perfect vessel for moral panic. This is also true because children as historical agents throughout the 20th century acted as creators of new attitudes, subcultures, and trends that challenged or subverted those of their elders.114 As such, moral panics in Britain during this period were not always on behalf of children, but about them as well. Unfamiliar and often deliberately insular from adult society, the customs of the young came to be targets of suspicion. The idea of the ‘hoody’ is an example from the 1990s and 2000s where the clothing preferences, drinking habits, and other social choices of teenagers were used in the press to present a negative stereotype of children as menaces to society.115 As discussed in Chapter One, because such terms were commonly used to describe both adults and children (anyone from 15 to 30 years old), their use was symptomatic of a belief that criminal or antisocial behaviour disqualified children from being children; that they were ‘adult in everything except years’, as Michael Howard said about young offenders in 1993.116

    Similarly, the media frenzy surrounding the dangers of the ‘video nasty’ of the late 1980s and 1990s was exemplary of an attitude that cast an element of youth culture as dangerous, to both themselves and others. Further complicating this was the scare’s entanglement with more general fears over new technology and the increasing influence of technological environments in children’s lives. In many ways this scare was a successor to the comic book moral panics of the 1950s and a progenitor of the video game panics of the 2000s, highlighting the constant connection and suspicion placed on children and their tendency towards early adoption of new forms of media.117

    Historical discourse on video nasties as a moral panic has been focussed on the relationship between media, government, and public, and has sought to debate how the scandal came to materialise and its social and cultural impacts. Julian Petley has argued that the scandal was a case study in how the concept of ‘public opinion’ can be invoked by government and media as a tool with which to shape public opinion.118 Kate Egan’s work discusses the manner by which video nasty censorship was not simply a product of law, but of a relationship between regulative, cultural, and economic factors that together were primed and utilised by campaigners to influence public opinion.119 Utilising their work, and that of historians of contemporaneous scandals such as David Miller, I focus on the video nasty panic in order to examine how public discourse came to represent the home and digital environments, and consequently its impact on children’s lives. I argue that tabloid media reporting on video nasties was an early example of what would become a ubiquitous trend during this period: the blaming of the decline in childhood health and mobility on new technologies, and indeed children themselves as willing denizens of these new digital environments. As part of this narrative, the indoor environment of the home, previously cast as a safe space for children, came to be constructed as dangerous due to devices like the TV and video player corrupting it. An important distinction here is that the danger posed was of a different variety to that by strangers, as it was primarily a danger to health rather than safety. Furthermore, the media differentiated the dangers of the technologized home from the stranger-stalked urban street by arguing that, with technology, children became active participants in their own destruction. This narrative left many children, in particular those with worse access to outdoor environments that were regarded as ‘safe’ such as a garden, in a catch-22 situation where almost any environment they could exist in was thought of by adults as either unsafe, improper, or unhealthy.

    In 1984 the Thatcher government introduced the Video Recordings Act to classify every film released on video with an age rating. This act was unique in Europe (aside from Ireland) in that its classifications carried legal force and therefore made it a criminal offence to distribute videos to certain people – children being the primary target – with around 3,200 fines issued between 1984 and 2005.120 Why was it, then, that the British system was so uniquely punitive? The answer was a creature known as the ‘video nasty’, around which a significant furore arose in the 1980s and 1990s. Video nasties were home videos that were deemed too inappropriate for even adults to watch and were thus censored in Britain, though the justification for this censorship was primarily based around protecting young people. Public campaigners such as the conservative activist Mary Whitehouse and politicians of all parties helped to create the idea of the video nasty, but it was the national press, often invoking ‘public opinion’ that amplified the message and created a signification spiral in which the threat posed by video nasties was constantly escalated.121 The result was an increasingly strident campaign for firm legislative measures to be taken.

    Home video took off in Britain after 1979, and at first the industry was dominated by a plethora of small independent film makers. UK video rights could be bought for as little as £1000, and as such the video shelves were stocked with (what was considered at the time as) ultra-violent films and soft-core pornography, usually housed in garish, lurid covers. Indeed, cover art was often analysed more in the press than the actual content of the films, as they were easy symbols to proselytise over, and many film distributers deliberately made violent or sexual covers because they knew the attention they would generate.122 This was a radical departure from what British audiences (and regulators) were used to, as this kind of material had mostly been withheld from view in mainstream cinemas, and at this time the home-video scene was unregulated. The prospect of uncensored home video thus rapidly emerged as a ‘threat to societal values and interests’.123 The first complaints were made to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) in 1981 but it was when the first national press story about the dangers of domestic video was published in The Mail in 1982 that a real campaign began to emerge. The Mail’s article read:

    More and more children… are catching on to the fact that their parents’ machine can give them the opportunity to watch the worst excesses of cinema sex and violence.124

    This article also introduced what would be a common theme of this media campaign: a figurehead person as stand-in for public opinion. In this case it was Richard Neighbour, a teacher, who worried that ‘video gives the children access to something that the parents may not be able to control’.125

    The Sunday Times followed on the 23 May with the headline How High Street Horror is Invading the Home, and this was the first time that the term ‘video nasties’ was used in the national press.126 The article warned that:

    Uncensored horror video cassettes, available to anybody of any age, have arrived in Britain’s High Streets.127

    Specific titles singled out by The Sunday Times included The Driller Killer, SS Experiment Camp, Cannibal Holocaust, I Spit on Your Grave, and Snuff. As I will show, the totality of newspaper coverage of the supposed dangers of these films came to represent the modern technologically infused home environment as a corrupting influence on young people, and thus problematised the very environment that was simultaneously being promoted as the only safe place left for children. The Sunday Times reported extensively on the video nasty saga, and repeatedly drew attention to itself as a leading actor in the events it described, exemplifying the fact that the parliamentary questions and police actions taken from 1982 onwards were partly a response to journalistic efforts. The Texas Chainsaw Massacre featured for the first time in an article for The Express on the 28 May headlined This Poison Being Peddled as Home ‘Entertainment’.128 Richard Neighbour was quoted again, alongside Lord Chief Justice Lane, warning about the ‘positive incentives to commit crime’ offered by scenes of violence ‘depicted on various screens of all sizes’.129 The Express also suggested that video shops should, like sex shops, be licensed by local councils. The Daily Mail was similarly campaigning:

    The video boom has meant that thousands of out-of-work, unstable teenagers are currently gorging themselves day-in-day-out on scenes of torture and depravity. We need censorship at the moment as we have never needed it before. And if video censorship of the most stringent kind isn’t brought in pretty damned quick we’re going to have an upsurge in violence and terror and abuse in our land and homes the like of which we never suspected in our wildest terror.130

    The reference to the ‘out-of-work’ in this quote again points to the class dimension at play here, suggesting a particular type of young person as being at risk of video corruption. The later call to protect ‘our land and homes’ clearly identifies the environments at risk, and the fact that these out-of-work children are part of an ‘other’.

    Around the time of The Express article the news broke that the Metropolitan Police Obscene Publications Squad has seized a copy of SS Experiment Camp and had sent a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) with a view to his bringing a possible test case against the video under the 1959 Obscene Publications Act (OPA). In another Sunday Times article on 30 May, Detective Chief Superintendent Kruger was quoted saying that ‘horror videos are a new concept, and I think we’re going to get involved in them more and more’.131 The following week the newspaper revealed that The Driller Killer and I Spit on Your Grave had also been referred to the DPP and it was from this point onwards that politicians began to get involved with this moral issue, raising a number of questions about videos in both the Commons and the Lords.132 Of particular note is Mary Whitehouse, the president of the National Viewers’ and Listeners’ Association (NVLA), who is credited with coining the term ‘video nasties’.133 The NVLA was established in in 1965 by Whitehouse as a pressure group that campaigned to ‘clean up TV’ for ‘taste and decency issues’, but it was under the Thatcher governments she had most success. Whitehouse personally phoned and wrote to Thatcher, forwarded on messages from concerned teachers and parents, and met privately with her in September 1983 after which Thatcher’s private secretary wrote in a letter that she:

    …agrees with Mrs Whitehouse that piecemeal legislation on obscenity is unsatisfactory and that the Government ought to be bringing forward proposals for a general reform of the Obscene Publications Acts, which she believes to be ineffective.134

    With her message boosted in the media, politicians began to heed her warnings to the extent that she was able to give MPs a private screening of edited highlights from these films in the House of Commons in late 1983, including extracts from her most-hated film, The Evil Dead.135

    Whitehouse found this prominence in concert with the national press, particularly The Mail, in which her voice went uncontested in calling for stricter crackdowns. Even after the DPP did begin to prosecute these films as early as August 1982 Whitehouse was publicly calling in The Mail for their resignation due to the punishments being too lenient.136 Even so, since it had now been established that violent videos could be classified as obscene under the OPA, police forces around Britain soon began raiding video distributors and seizing thousands of tapes which they claimed breached the law. The Mail continued to cheer the police on and press for further censorship by running stories that claimed a link between violent films and violent acts. In A Video Nasty Killer the paper called a video nasty the ‘trigger that finally turned a young psychopath into a killer’.137 In Hooking of the Video Junkies, The Mail equated video watching to drug use, saying that ‘more and more children are becoming videoholics’ and that their ‘impressionable minds’ could be convinced to ‘recreate murders or rape’.138 The Daily Express furthered this impression, calling horror videos a ‘new cult… sweeping the country’ and argued the films fuelled ‘sexual psychopathic fantasies’.139 The early 1980s was a period that saw a general rise in violent crime in Britain, and against the backdrop of these newspaper articles, it is perhaps unsurprising – as Dickinson says – that many politicians began to ponder if ‘perhaps there was something in the fact that the 1978-1982 period had seen a rise in both violent crime and video player ownership’.140 However, as Grieveson noted, the idea of the highly-impressionable innocent child had been used as a justification for film censorship since the debut of cinema, so what made this moral panic significant was that it was about films that could be watched in the private space of the home.141

    The media played such a crucial role in helping to shape people’s perceptions of the video nasty because most people, including by her own admission Mary Whitehouse herself, had never actually seen one. Cohen argues that nebulous threats like ‘absent fathers, feckless mothers… TV violence and video nasties’ were able to be made into a ‘potent symbol for everything that had gone wrong in Britain’ via a whole series of processed images and coded representations.142 Panic-inducing media reporting has the power to make ‘people become indignant or angry, formulate theories and plans, make speeches, write letters to the newspapers…’.143 The threekey ingredients in this process, Cohen argues, are exaggeration, prediction, and symbolisation. Exaggeration is typified by sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary, and the deliberate heightening of those elements of the story considered as news – such as with The Mail’s Secret Video Show article warning of children watching ‘the worst excesses of cinema sex and violence’.144 Prediction involves a dire warning that the events in question will get worse if nothing is done, such as with Tory MP Peter Lloyd quoted in The Sunday Times saying that ‘these video sales and rentals will be the problem of next year and the year after’.145 The final ingredient is symbolisation, which is where certain words or terms come to acquire wholly negative meanings and connotations, as in the phrase ‘video nasty’, and the focus of newspapers on the covers rather than the contents of the films.146 The image of the child ‘glued’ to the TV screen came to symbolise a corruption brought into the usually safe environment of the home. As a Loughborough university report in 1993 said, ‘today’s youth culture of discos, computers and video games’ was to blame for dramatic falls in levels of physical activity in children and the birth of the ‘couch potato generation’.147 In this way a parallel culture of suspicion arose in indoor as well as outdoor environments, the difference being the threat was an internal corruption of children rather than an external attack.

    Concerns in the papers began to filter into the political space as they both invoked and incited public opinion on this issue. On 15 December 1982, Gareth Wardell, Labour MP for Gower introduced a bill which would have made it an offence to rent or sell adult videos to children and young people, describing the video recorder as ‘a potential weapon that may be used to attack the emotions of our children and young persons’ and the videos as ‘a slur on British life’.148 The bill failed to win government support however, as Thatcher’s governments were always reluctant to regulate the private sphere despite their desire to return to ‘Victorian values’.149 It was the government’s lack of support for Wardell’s bill which set off what would become the next stage of The Mail’s ‘Ban the Sadist Videos’ campaign, with a February 1983 headlined We Must Protect Our Children Now.150 Other headlines in the series included Rape of Our Children’s Minds and Sadism for Six Year Olds.151 The pressure from the press was so effusive that by April 1983 Norman Abbott of the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) wrote for the trade magazine Broadcast that he didn’t think the voluntary classification scheme he was setting up was going to be given a ‘fair chance’, and indeed the scheme was denounced by Mary Whitehouse as ‘unworkable’ as soon as it was announced.152

    After winning the 1983 general election, Thatcher spoke again on the matter, saying that ‘it is not enough to have voluntary regulation. We must bring in a ban to regulate the matter’ and indeed it soon became apparent that a draft bill had already been completed. Stories in the papers continued apace leading up to the bill’s first and second readings in the Commons, particularly about crimes committed under the supposed influence of a video nasty. One now notorious article in The Mirror titled Pony Maniac Strikes Again quoted a police spokesman as saying that the perpetrator of a series of sexual attacks on ponies ‘could have been affected by video nasties or a new moon’.153 The same year Conservative MP Graham Bright claimed in a TV interview that ‘research is taking place and it will show that these films not only affect young people but I believe they affect dogs as well’.154 A claim that four in ten children had seen a video nasty, based on a 1983 academic report, was often banded around both in parliament and the press despite the fact that one of the researchers on that study had said its lead researcher had ‘selectively interpreted, and in some cases outright fabricated, a good deal of the evidence to support the predetermined conclusion that the videos were responsible for criminal activity’.155

    It was not just children who needed protecting, however. After watching a screening of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, BBFC chief censor James Ferman said that ‘It’s all right for you middle class cineastes to see this film, but what would happen if a factory worker in Manchester happened to see it?’ – suggesting that person would take the film as inspiration for violent acts.156 Lord Chief Justice Lane was also quoted in The Mail as saying ‘it is not merely children who need to be preven­ted from seeing these frightful publications. There are others upon whom the effects may be even more disastrous… human beings are imitative, and the less strong-minded the more imitative they are’.157 This type of language was reminiscent of the infamous 1960 obscenity trial brought against Lady Chatterley’s Lover, where the chief prosecutor was laughed at for asking if it was ‘a book that you would even wish your wife or your servants to read?’ or ‘working class youths’.158 The Chatterley trial highlighted that social difference was still considered a factor in who could be ‘trusted’ to consume certain pieces of media, and the same was true of the discussion around video nasties, although this time children were also being used as a justification for general censorship.

    The video nasty panic erupted and escalated in the media with surprising speed and intensity. Largely this can be attributed to what Hall calls the ‘signification spiral’, wherein an issue is identified and then linked to a much wider fear to the ultimate end of calling for action.159 The video nasty panic was particularly rich in links to other perceived issues, such as the tropes of the anti-social family, absentee father, and feckless mother, and therefore could easily be used as a catalytic issue around which to press more general fears. For example, a Mail story about a ‘video rapist’ quoted the director of the NSPCC saying ‘I had a case where a worker was not able to interview a family until all of them, including children, had finished viewing the rape scene in I Spit on Your Grave’.160 Links to organised crime were also common. The News of the World lambasted the ‘evil sex-kings’ and ‘get-rich-quick gangsters’ of the video trade.161 Mean­while The Mail’s Rape of Our Children’s Minds editorial asked:

    Are we insane? Are we bent on rotting our own society from within? Are we determined to spur to a gallop the forces of decadence that threaten to drag us down?.162

    The threat identified as coming from ‘within’ shows that technology was considered a substantively different category of to the ‘outsider’ danger of strangers, social workers, or urban cityscapes. The use of this kind of framing also placed more blame on children themselves, as it suggested they had chosen the TV to become an integral element of ‘youth culture’, and as such the threat from ‘within’ came from inside their minds as well as their homes. This is partly why video nasties were so often linked to real-world acts of violence, as it was thought they had the potential to incite violence. DCI Kruger was prominently featured in the press on this point, stating in The Telegraph that ‘the police are here to prevent violence for violence’s sake, which is precisely what these films glorify’.163

    Along similar lines in June 1983, under the headline Fury Over the Video Rapist The Mail reported that ‘Demands for action on video “nasties” mounted last night following the case of a teenage rapist who struck twice after watching pornographic films’.164 However, according to the rest of the article, it was not pornographic but horror videos that he had watched. Furthermore, it omitted the fact that the teen had seven previous offences for theft and burglary, and that he had just been released from a detention centre when he raped the two women. The shakiness of the story, however, did not deter the reporter from warning that ‘the impact that this sick, beastly money-making corruption is having on innocent minds is going to make previous anxieties about violence on television look like worries about the impact of Enid Blyton!’.165 Further links between violent videos and actual violence were drawn by The Times under the headline Rapist ‘Was Addicted to Video Nasties’.166 In the article the perpetrator’s wife is quoted as saying ‘He was loving, kind and considerate until he became addicted to watching an endless string of horrifying video films containing detailed scenes of the most depraved and vicious kind’.167 However the films named in the paper, The Thing and Last House on the Left do not contain ‘multiple sex attacks’ as the paper suggested and, more to the point, the perpetrator had undergone a severe personality change after suffering brain damage in a car crash in 1979, had taken a cocktail of drink and drugs before the rape, and at the time of the offence was on bail – which had been strongly opposed by the police – for two previous assaults.168 In a case such as this, it is clear that the paper selectively reported the facts in order to build a particular case against these at-home videos.

    Some critical voices in The Times, Telegraph, Financial Times, and Guardian were apprehensive about Thatcher’s proposed new law, which would give the government censorship rights over a great deal more than simply a few ‘nasties’, most of which had already vanished from the market thanks to police and court actions under the OPA anyway. These were minor interventions, however, against an overwhelming wall of media support for the bill, and as such it passed into law in July 1984. Interestingly, public opinion – whilst being frequently called on in the press as the driver of their campaigns – was not in support of this bill. Firstly, there is very little evidence of any gathering of data about public opinion at all, and what little there is does not support the idea that the ‘nasty’ panic was widespread. A What Video survey in 1982 concluded that for 60% of those who rented or bought videos, horror/science fiction was their favourite category. A MORI poll in October 1983 revealed that 92% of those polled had never been offended by the contents of a pre-recorded video cassette, and another in March 1984 showed that 65% of those interviewed were opposed to the government deciding which videos were available for home viewing. As Miller wrote of the moral panic concept in general:

    It is never very clear who is doing the panicking. Is it the media, the government, the public, or who? One reason for this lack of clarity is that distinctions between the media and the state, between the media and public belief, and between the state and other social institutions and groups are dissolved.169

    Figure VII. Children gathered round a PlayStation, as seen on BBC News, 1999.170

    The link drawn in the press between video nasties (and digital technologies more broadly) and the correlating decline in children’s physical health was very clear, even though the headlines about declining play were usually based on academic work that would tend to acknowledge that technology was only part of the narrative.171 This disconnect between truth and popular perception meant the computer and TV were often talked about publicly as the problem to the exclusion of other factors. It was certainly the case, as a 2006 report for the NSPCC found, that restricting children to the indoors and digital environments was contributing to rising levels of obesity, diabetes, depression and other health problems, but in majority this was due to children no longer being allowed outside because of the perceived dangers of strangers and cars.172 In truth children with a lack of access to new technologies found themselves on the wrong side of a ‘digital divide’ which exacerbated pre-existing social divergences as highly social children more readily adopted digital devices as a means for deepening and expanding relations whereas less social children showed the opposite pattern.173 Furthermore, the ‘billion-dollar industries’ in technology surrounding children were making increasingly enviable profits from the sale of both security and safety devices as well as indoor education and play devices, in essence selling products that were both ‘the problem’ and ‘the solution’.174

    2.7 Conclusion

    Young people during this period found themselves sandwiched between the threats of urban spaces, paedophiles, and new technologies. The British media and the tabloid press especially, working in tandem with figures and groups representing the public, had taken a number of real but minor dangers and had created from them a series of moral panics, based around key ‘signal crimes’, that caused adults to restrict children’s independence and mobility for fear that the environments of childhood had become corrupted. The media not only reflected but actively produced a cultural geography of fear that redefined where children could and should exist. The Orkney scandal, the stranger-danger panic, and the video nasty controversy each reveal how different environments – rural, urban, and domestic – were symbolically charged with moral meaning. These meanings were not neutral but deeply classed, gendered, and spatialised, often privileging middle-class rural domesticity as the idealised space of childhood while casting urban, public, and technological environments as sites of danger, corruption, or moral failure.

    Considering these moral panics within the ‘circuit of culture’ framework clarifies how media representations translated into material consequences. They contributed to a widespread culture of restriction toward children’s independent mobility, a reconfiguration of public and private space, and a growing suspicion of both outdoor and indoor environments. The result was a paradoxical situation in which children were increasingly expected to be confined to environments that were themselves problematised either as unsafe or unhealthy. Moreover, the media’s selective focus on certain dangers (strangers, paedophiles, video nasties) over others (cars, environmental degradation, domestic abuse) reveals how public anxieties were not simply responses to risk but were shaped by historically specific discourses of morality, class, and control. In reality the scale of these ‘new’ threats was not evidently greater than those of previous decades. Nevertheless, the belief in these dangers resulted in physical changes to children’s environments, as houses, schools, playgrounds, and neighbourhoods were built to be more insular – shielding those ‘inside’ from those ‘outside’. The threats from cars and car-oriented infrastructure were far more real to children, and indeed were the inciting factors behind the initial decline in children’s outside activity, but they did not provoke moral panic because they were not newsworthy. Instead, the media reporting of tabloids specifically created a climate of fear that represented most childhood environments as unsafe; particularly the tv-homes and stranger-stalked public urban spaces of working-class areas.

    As the following chapters will explore through the two North East regional case studies of Byker and Chopwell, national narratives were not uniformly experienced but were mediated, resisted, or reinforced in different ways depending on local context. Understanding this interplay between expert discourse, public discourse, local environment, and individual childhoods is essential for grasping how the landscapes of play, safety, and risk were constructed and contested during this period. This is the context of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s in which real families and children, like those featured in the following interviews, had to negotiate the tricky process of growing up.

    <- Chapter 1Chapter 3 ->

    References

    1 ‘Tabloid’ as in the style of journalism, as supposed to the format of paper.

    2 Adrian Bingham and Martin Conboy, Tabloid Century: The Popular Press in Britain, 1896 to the Present (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2015) 86; Kevin Williams, Read All about It!: A History of the British Newspaper (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 211.

    3 Ibid, 217.

    4 Bingham and Conboy, Tabloid Century, 224.

    5 Finlo Rohrer, ‘In praise of summer mischief,’ BBC News Magazine, accessed 15 February 2022, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7510372.stm.

    6 Mora et al., ‘Practice Theories and the “Circuit of Culture”,’ 59.

    7 Dick Hobbs, Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class and Detectives in the East End of London (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 89; Martin Innes, ‘Signal crimes’: Detective Work, Mass Media and Constructing Collective Memory (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003), 63.

    8 Ibid, 66.

    9 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 10.

    10 Susan Cutter, Living with Risk: The Geography of Technological Hazards (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), 54.

    11 Paul Slovic, ‘Perceptions of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm,’ in Social Theories of Risk, eds. Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Goulding (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 55.

    12 In practice they of course did not.

    13 S.N. ‘Dangers of Motor Traffic,’ Daily Mirror, 4 August 1910.

    14 S.N. ‘The classless society,’ Economist, 19 February 1994, 27.

    15 John Myers, The Backlash: Child Protection Under Fire (London: Sage, 1994), 70.

    16 Kate Hunt and Jenny Kitzinger, ‘Public Place, Private Issue: The Public’s Reaction to the Zero Tolerance Campaign against Violence against Women,’ in Defining Violence, ed. Hannah Bradby (Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1996), 45.

    17 Ibid, 59.

    18 Ibid, 59.

    19 Jenny Kitzinger, Framing Abuse: Media Influence and Public Understanding of Sexual Violence Against Children (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 36.

    20 Keith Soothill and Sylvia Walby, Sex Crime in the News (London: Routledge, 1991), 118.

    21 Paul Skidmore, ‘Telling Tales; Media Power, Ideology and the Reporting of Child Sexual Abuse,’ in Crime and Media; David Kidd-Hewitt and Richard Osborne, The Post-Modern Spectacle (London: Pluto Press, 1995), 83.

    22 Bingham, ‘It Would be Better for the Newspapers to Call a Spade a Spade,’ 102; Melanie McFadyean, ‘Sex and the Under-age Girl,’ New Society, 14 June 1984.

    23 Audrey Droisen and Emily Driver, Child Sexual Abuse: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 148.

    24 Bingham, ‘It Would be Better for the Newspapers to Call a Spade a Spade,’ 106.

    25 Rosaline Barbour, Developing Focus Group Research (London: Sage, 1999), 202.

    26 S.N. ‘Evil Mr Staring Eyes,’ Sun, 2 May 1991.

    27 S.N. ‘Smile that hid the violent depravity of sex fiend headmaster,’ Star, 12 April 1991.

    28 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), 194.

    29 S.N. ‘Man tells of homosexual abuse by care staff,’ The Independent, 10 October 1991; Kitzinger, Framing Abuse, 139.

    30 Ian Katz, ‘Child Abuse Case Officer “Framed”,’ Guardian, 30 October 1991, 2.

    31 James Dalrymple, ‘Slaughter of the Lambs,’ Sunday Times, 23 June 1991, 5.

    32 Ibid, 5.

    33 Specific 1980s/90s North East statistics are not available on this point, but more general studies from Britain and other countries around the world support this point: Kathryn Maguire-Jack et al., ‘Rural Child Maltreatment: A Scoping Literature Review,’ Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 22, no. 5 (2021): 1316; Kathryn Maguire-Jack and Kim Hyunil, ‘Rural Differences in Child Maltreatment Reports, Reporters, and Service Responses,’ Children and Youth Services Review 120 (2021): 105792; Ryo Uchida, ‘“Child Abuse” Occurs in Urban Areas,’ The Journal of Educational Sociology 76 (2005): 129-148.

    34 Rebecca Hardy, ‘Scandal of sex abuse at top public schools,’ Daily Mail, 10 January 1991, 17.

    35 S.N. ‘Twelve years for sex charge headmaster,’ Dundee Courier, 13 April 1991, 8.

    36 Eileen Munro, Munro Review of Child Protection: A child-centred system (London: Department for Education, 2011), 19.

    37 Ibid, 19.

    38 Ibid, 125.

    39 Maria Leedham, ‘“Social Workers Failed to Heed Warnings”: A Text-Based Study of How a Profession Is Portrayed in UK Newspapers,’ The British Journal of Social Work 52 (2022): 1110; Aimee Georgeson, ‘A Feminist Social Work Perspective on Misogyny and the Function of Empathy,’ Feminist Dissent 8 (2025): 103.

    40 John Gyford et al., The Changing Politics of Local Government (London: Routledge, 1989), 310.

    41 S.N. ‘Poison at Red Ted’s Town Hall,’ Daily Mail, 18 July 1985.

    42 ‘Lambeth: The Council that Cares,’ BFI Video, 20:00, https://player.bfi.org.uk/free/film/watch-lambeth-the-council-that-cares-1982-online.

    43 S.N. ‘Why did they not save her?,’ Daily Mail, 29 March 1985, 6.

    44 Kitzinger, Framing Abuse, 86.

    45 News at Ten, aired 12 March 1991 on ITV, ITV Archive.

    46 News at Ten, aired 4 April 1991 on ITV, ITV Archive.

    47 Social Work England, ‘Guidance on the Professional Standards,’ Accessed 27 September 2022, https://www.socialworkengland.org.uk/standards/professional-standards-guidance/.

    48 Kitzinger, Framing Abuse, 95.

    49 Newsnight, aired 15 March 1991 on BBC 2, BBC Archive.

    50 Newsnight, aired 15 March 1991 on BBC 2, BBC Archive.

    51 Seven O’clock News, aired12 March 1991 on Channel 4, National Archives; S.N. ‘Islanders Trapped in a Nightmare,’ Scotland on Sunday, 10 March 1991.

    52 James Dalrymple, ‘Secrets of Orkneys ‘vice ring’ untravel,’ Sunday Times, 1 September 1991, 4.

    53 William Paul, ‘Orkney outcry over child abuse,’ Sunday Tribune, 10 March 1991, 7.

    54 S.N. ‘Fears of an Outraged Island,’ Mail on Sunday, 3 March 1991; Stephen Oldfield, ‘The day of hope for Satan case children,’ Daily Mail, 2 March 1991; S.N. ‘Orkney Reels,’ Scotland on Sunday, 2 March 1991. Other headlines of the period: ‘Islanders threaten to picket hearing into child abuse,’ Observer, 3 March 1991; ‘Islanders support families,’ Glasgow Herald, 5 March 1991; ‘OUTRAGE: They all came together in the small hall to demand: give us back our children,’ Mail on Sunday, 3 March 1991; ‘Island anger,’ Evening News, 4 March 1991.

    55 As described in the New York Times’ review, which also describes that the village ‘casts its spell’ over the main character: Janet Maslin, ‘Film: “Local Hero,” Houston-to-Scotland Odyssey,’ New York Times, 17 February 1983, 25.

    56 Anna Smith, ‘Taught to Nick Cars,’ Daily Record, 6 April 1991, 1.

    57 Eric Bailey, ‘Family Impatient to Start Work on Rebuilding their Paradise Lost,’ Daily Telegraph, 4 March 1991, 10.

    58 Kerry Gill, ‘Orkney parents dismiss child abuse allegations as ridiculous,’ Times, 4 March 1991, 2.

    59 S.N. ‘They left here unharmed, they’re coming home abused,’ Daily Mirror, 5 April 1991.

    60 Early Evening News, 5 April 1991 on ITV, ITV Archive.

    61 Express, 6 April 1991.

    62 Scotsman, 6 April 1991; Scotland on Sunday, 7 April 1991.

    63 Scotland on Sunday, 24 March 1991.

    64 Evening News, 28 March 1991.

    65 BBC2, Newsnight, 15 March 1991.

    66 Daily Record, 6 April 1991; ‘They taught me how to nick cars, mum’ Daily Star, 6 April 1991.

    67 Anna Smith, ‘Taught to Nick Cars,’ Daily Record, 6 April 1991, 1.

    68 Daily Mirror, 5 April 1991.

    69 Daily Record, 6 April 1991, 5.

    70 Daily Record, 6 April 1991, 5.

    71 David Jenkins, Intimate Enemies: Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992), 186.

    72 Independent, 1 April 1991.

    73 Independent, ‘The Orkney Inquiry: “Reporter” is central figure in emotional saga,’ 28 October 1992.

    74 Kitzinger, Framing Abuse, 95.

    75 Kathryn Maguire-Jack and Kim Hyunil, ‘Rural Differences in Child Maltreatment Reports, Reporters, and Service Responses,’ Children and Youth Services Review 120 (2021): 105792.

    Ryo Uchida, ‘“Child Abuse” Occurs in Urban Areas,’ The Journal of Educational Sociology 76 (2005): 129-148.

    76 Geof Newiss, Beyond ‘Stranger Danger’: Teaching Children About Staying Safe from Abduction (London: Action Against Abduction, 2014), 10; Craig John Robert Collie and Karen Shalev Greene, ‘Examining Offender, Victim and Offence Characteristics in Cases of Stranger Child Abduction: An Exploratory Comparison of Attempted and Completed Cases Using Publicly Available Data from the UK,’ Aggression and Violent Behaviour 35 (2017): 73.

    77 Aimee Wodda, ‘Stranger Danger!,’ Journal of Family Strengths 18, no 1 (2018): 10.

    78 David Pimentel, ‘Criminal child neglect and the “free range kid”: Is overprotective parenting the new standard of care?,’ Law Review 2 (2012): 960.

    79 Jenny Kitzinger and Paula Skidmore, ‘Playing safe: Media coverage of child sexual abuse prevention strategies,’ Child Abuse Review 4, no. 1 (1995): 48.

    80 NSPCC, NSPCC Fact Pack (London: NSPCC, 1992).

    81 Steven Collings, ‘The Impact of Contextual Ambiguity on the Interpretation and Recall of Child Sexual Abuse Media Reports,’ Journal of Interpersonal Violence 17 (2002): 1063–1074.

    82 As quoted in: Kitzinger and Skidmore, ‘Playing safe,’ 47–56.

    83 Jenny Kitzinger, Framing Abuse: Media Influence and Public Understanding of Sexual Violence Against Children (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 130.

    84 Camilla Gleeson Mead and Sally Kelty, ‘Violence next Door: The Influence of Friendship with Perpetrators on Responses to Intimate Partner Violence,’ Journal of Interpersonal Violence 36 (2021): 7–8.

    85 Michele Elliot, Bullying: A Practical Guide to Coping for Schools (London: Longman, 1991), 20, 121.

    86 Dougal Shaw, ‘Stranger Danger: Still the right message for children?,’ BBC News 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-45813069.

    87 Kate Richardson, ‘Dissecting Disbelief: Possible Reasons for the Denial of the Existence of Ritual Abuse in the United Kingdom,’ International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 4 (2015): 77.

    88 Thomas Markus, Buildings & Power: Freedom and Control in the Origin of Modern Building Types (London: Routledge, 1993), 13.

    89 Home Office, ‘Say no to Strangers’ September 1985.

    90 ITV, ‘Strangers – Mr Punch,’ 1980.

    91 Ibid.

    92 Joe Frost, A History of Children’s Play and Play Environments (London: Routledge, 2010), 229.

    93 Cowman, ‘Play streets,’ 254.

    94 As seen in the portrayal of cars and slogan of this PIF: Central Office of Information, ‘Never go with Strangers,’ Public Information Film, 1971; Once again, the notion of a ‘strange car’ is a vague one that could mislead children if they do not perceive a particular car to be ‘strange’.

    95 Home Office, ‘Say no to Strangers,’ Public Information Film, September 1985.

    96 Duncan Staff, The Lost Boy (Bantam Press, 2007), 17-18.

    97 Robert Church, Well Done, Boys: The Life and Crimes of Robert Black (London: Constable, 1996), 77.

    98 ‘New Safety Strap Wins High Praise,’ Newcastle Journal, 22 July 1993, 9.

    99 How Safe are Our Children, Kidscape (1993), 1.

    100 NSPCC Annual Report 1985.

    101 ‘Attempts to steal children reinforce danger message,’ Newcastle Journal (20 June 1990), 7.

    102 The Times, Paedophile lists for police, 19 December 1996.

    103 Terry Thomas, ‘The Sex Offender Register, Community Notification and Some Reflections,’ in Managing High Risk Sex Offenders in the Community, ed. Hazel Kemshall and Gill McIvor (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2010), 57.

    104 Richard Wright, Sex offender laws: failed policies, new directions (New York: Springer, 2014), 50.

    105 Ian Burrell, ‘Paedophile lists prompt mob attacks,’ The Independent (24 February 1997), 2.

    106 Crane, Child Protection in England, 33.

    107 The Guardian, 24 November 1996; The Observer, 15 December 1996; The Times, 11 January 1997; The Daily Mail, 3 February 1997; The Times, 12 October 1997.

    108 Press and Journal, 9 June 1997; Torquay Herald Express, 2 September 1997.

    109 Bill Hebenton and Terry Thomas, ‘Sexual Offenders in the Community: Reflections on Problems of Law, Community and Risk Management in the USA, England and Wales,’ International Journal of the Sociology of Law 24 (1996): 430.

    110 Guardian, 18 October 1997; Evening Argus, 14 October 1997.

    111 Hebenton and Thomas, ‘Sexual Offenders in the Community,’ 427; Daily Record, 25 February 1997.

    112 Graham Wade, ‘The Video Nasty that Children Ought to See,’ The Guardian,15 Oct 1985, 13.

    113 Mama Fatima Singhateh, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale, Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of Children, United Nations Human Rights Council, March 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4036606.

    114 Carolyn Jackson and Penny Tinkler, ‘“Ladettes” and “Modern Girls”: ‘Troublesome’ Young Femininities,’ The Sociological Review, 55 (2007): 251.

    115 Ibid, 252.

    116 Barry Goldson, ‘A Reasoned Case for Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility,’ The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 48, no. 5 (2009): 514.

    117 April Armstrong, ‘Comic Books, Censorship, and Moral Panic,’ Princeton University Archives,https://blogs.princeton.edu/mudd/2018/04/comic-books-censorship-and-moral-panic/.

    118 Julian Petley, ‘“Are We Insane?”. The “Video Nasty” Moral Panic,’ Recherches Sociologiques Et Anthropologiques 43, no. 1 (2012): 12.

    119 Kate Egan, Trash or Treasure? Censorship and the Changing Meanings of the Video Nasties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 5.

    120 Petley, ‘Are We Insane?,’ 35.

    121 Ibid, 3.

    122 Kate Egan, Trash or Treasure? Censorship and the Changing Meanings of the Video Nasties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 57.

    123 Stanley Cohen, ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics,’ 2002.

    124 The Secret Video Show, The Mail, 12 May 1982.

    125 Richard Neighbour, ‘The Secret Video Show,’ Mail, 12 May 1982.

    126 As far as I have been able to determine.

    127 ‘How High Street Horror is Invading the Home,’ Sunday Times, 23 May 1982.

    128This Poison Being Peddled as Home “Entertainment”,’ The Express, 28 May 1982.

    129 Ibid.

    130 ‘Switch Off the Nasties,’ Daily Mail, 29 June 1983, 7.

    131 ‘Watchdog is unleashed on video horror,’ Sunday Times, 30 May 1982.

    132 Commons: John Fraser, ‘Amendment Of Section 21 Of 1956 C 74,’ House of Commons (9 July 1982), https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-07-09/debates/3f6e23b2-2866-4721-8a94-f69c2157907f/AmendmentOfSection21Of1956C74?highlight=video%20nasty#contribution-f7ea551f-76c9-4dd3-a757-8e3d847a530b; Lords: Viscount Colville of Culross, ‘Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill,’ House of Lords (9 June 1982), https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1982-06-09/debates/16b0a2b1-4c58-4a93-9233-a6d26a0cc504/Cinematograph(Amendment)Bill?highlight=video%20nasty#contribution-f9f0b05d-c2ea-4c4c-948a-9d7cb32de9b1.

    133 Andrew Holmes, ‘Let there be blood,’ Guardian, 5 July 2002.

    134 ‘Home Affairs. Obscenity legislation (video nasties): meetings with Mary Whitehouse,’ Margaret Thatcher Foundation, accessed 20 April 2021, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/source/prem19/prem19-1792.

    135 Richard Stanley, ‘Dying Light: An Obituary for the Great British Horror Movie,’ in Steve Chibnall and Julian Petley (eds.) British Horror Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002), 184.

    136 Ben Thompson, Ban This Filth!: Letters from the Mary Whitehouse Archive (London: Faber & Faber, 2012), 335.

    137 Christopher White, ‘A Video Nasty Killer,’ Daily Mail, 13 July 1983, 1.

    138 Richard Neighbour, ‘Hooking of the Video Junkies,’ Daily Mail, 13 August 1983, 6.

    139 Tony Dawe, ‘This Poison Is Being Peddled as Home “Entertainment”,’ Daily Express, 28 May 1982, 7; David Ross and Owen Summers, ‘God Help Our Little Children,’ Daily Express, 22 August 1983, 8.

    140 Kay Dickinson, Off Key: When Film and Music Won’t Work Together (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 132.

    141 Lee Grieveson, Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early-Twentieth Century America (Berkeley: University of California, 2004), 14.

    142 Cohen, ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics,’ ix.

    143 Ibid, 18.

    144 Ibid, 20.

    145 Ibid, 38.

    146 Ibid, 28.

    147 Lorraine Cale and Joe Harris, ‘Exercise Recommendations for Children and Young People,’ Physical Education Review 16, no.2 (1993): 97.

    148 ‘Video porn ban urged,’ Telegraph, 16 December 1982; ‘Video fears for the young,’ Guardian, 16 December 1982.

    149 Stephen Evans, ‘Thatcher and the Victorians: A Suitable Case for Comparison?,’ History 82, no. 268 (1997): 607.

    150 ‘We Must Protect Our Children Now,’ Mail, 25 February 1983.

    151 Rape of Our Children’s Minds,’ Mail, 30 June 1983; ‘Sadism for Six Year Olds,’ Mail, 24 November 1983.

    152 Norman Abbott, ‘Film Classification,’ Broadcast, 4th April 1983.

    153 ‘Pony Maniac Strikes Again,’ Daily Mirror, 3 January 1984.

    154 Graham Bright, ‘‘Interview: Video Nasties,’ Channel 4, 1984.

    155 Brian Brown, “Exactly What We Wanted,” The Video Nasties: Freedom and Censorship in the Media (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 80.

    156 James Ferman, speech at London Film Festival, December 1975.

    157 Lord Chief Justice Lane quoted in ‘We must outlaw the hard porn,’ Mail, 9 November 1983.

    158 JSTOR Daily, Would You Let Your Servant Read This Book?, https://daily.jstor.org/would-you-let-your-servant-read-this-book/.

    159 Stuart Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse (Birmingham: University of Birmingham press, 1973).

    160 Lynda Lee Potter, ‘Fury Over the Video Rapist,’ Mail, 28 June 1983.

    161 News of the World, 13 November 1983.

    162Rape of Our Children’sMinds,’ Mail, 30 June 1983.

    163 ‘War on Video Violence,’ Telegraph, 5 September 1982.

    164 Lynda Lee Potter, Fury Over the Video Rapist, Mail, 28 June 1983.

    165 Ibid.

    166 Times, 5 August 1983.

    167 Ibid.

    168 Petley, ‘Are We Insane?,’ 52.

    169 David Miller, ‘AIDS, the Policy Process and Moral Panics,’ in David Miller et al. (eds) The Circuit of Mass Communication: Media Strategies, Representation and Audience Reception in the AIDS Crisis (London: Sage, 1998), 216.

    170 BBC Archive, ‘Children Playing PlayStation, 1999,’ https://archive-downloader.bbcrewind.co.uk/remarc/19990101_Childhood_Playstation?decade=1990s&theme=Childhood.

    171 As charted in this literature review of the period 1985-2010: Nor Fadzila Aziz and Ismail Said, ‘The Trends and Influential Factors of Children’s Use of Outdoor Environments: A Review,’ Asian Journal of Environment-Behaviour Studies 2 (2017): 204.

    172 Ruth Gardner, Developing an effective response to neglect and emotional harm to children (London: NSPCC, 2008), 14; ‘The Impact of Media Use and Screen Time on Children, Adolescents, and Families,’ American College of Pediatricians, accessed 14 April 2020, https://acpeds.org/position-statements/the-impact-of-media-use-and-screen-time-on-children-adolescents-and-families.

    173 Danby, Digital Childhoods, 61.

    174 Ibid, vii.